Multi-stakeholder design of forest governance and accountability arrangements in Equator province, Democratic Republic of Congo by Klaver, D.C.
Multi-stakeholder design of forest 
governance and accountability 
arrangements in Equator province, 
Democratic Republic of Congo
Dieuwke Klaver
Capacity Development and Institutional Change Programme
Wageningen International, The Netherlands
July 2009
With French summary / Avec un résumé en français

Multi-stakeholder design of forest 
governance and accountability 
arrangements in Equator province, 
Democratic Republic of Congo
Dieuwke Klaver
Capacity Development and Institutional Change Programme
Wageningen International, The Netherlands
July 2009
A joint publication of
IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature)
Forest Conservation Programme
Rue Mauverney 28
CH-1196 Gland
Switzerland
forests@iucn.org
Tel +41 22 999 02 61/3
Fax +41 22 364 97 20
www.iucn.org
Wageningen University & Research Centre, The Netherlands
Wageningen International
P. O. Box 88
6700 AB Wageningen
The Netherlands
info.wi@wur.nl
Tel +31 317 48 68 00
Fax +31 317 48 68 01
www.wi.wur.nl
© 2009 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and Wageningen University & Research Centre, The 
Netherlands
The designation of geographical entities in this report, and the presentation of the material, do not imply the expression of any opinion 
whatsoever on the part of IUCN or the Wageningen University & Research Centre concerning the legal status of any country, territory, 
or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in this publication do not 
necessarily reflect those of IUCN or the Wageningen University & Research Centre.
Reproduction of this publication for educational or other non-commercial purposes is authorized without prior written permission from 
the copyright holder provided the source is fully acknowledged. Reproduction of this publication for resale or other commercial purposes 
is prohibited without prior written permission of the copyright holder.
ISBN
978-2-8317-1209-3
Cover photo
Logs and charcoal at the port at Bikoro, Equator Province © D. Klaver.
Printed by RPC, www.rosseels.be
iContents
Acknowledgements .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ii
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Résumé .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  v
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The research questions .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Structure of the report  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Forest governance and SVBC – the context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Forest concessions and the forest law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Population and forest issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Decentralisation and forest governance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Strengthening Voices for Better Choices (SVBC) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 6
Achievements and added value of the platforms in forest governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Conclusions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8
3 Defining forest governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Good forest governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Good forest governance in Equator province .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .10
The way forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Conclusions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .13
4 Social accountability for improved forest governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
 Accountability and social accountability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
 The design of social accountability mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
 Accountability relations in Equator province.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .16 
 Designing social accountability relations – the way forward.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .18
 Conclusions.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  20
5 Reflections on governance, accountability and action research methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Forest governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Accountability.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  22
Action learning and research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6 Promoting forest governance and accountability – conclusions and recommendations .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .24
Answering the research questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
Recommendations for IUCN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Recommendations for future action research.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  26
Bibliography.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  27
Annexes .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  28
ii
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank the following people for providing 
valuable comments on earlier drafts of this document:
 Arend Jan van Bodegom and Freerk Wiersum, 
Wageningen International, Wageningen University & Research 
Centre, the Netherlands
 Matthew Markopoulos, IUCN Asia Regional Office, 
Bangkok, Thailand
 Joël Kiyulu, National Coordinator of the SVBC project, 
IUCN DRC Project Office, Kinshasa, DRC
 Guido Broekhoven, IUCN Regional Office for Europe, 
Brussels, Belgium
 Jesse Ribot, University of Illinois, Urbana, USA.
Abbreviations
ACREPADE Action Pour la Réconciliation, Paix et Développement 
 (Action for Reconciliation, Peace and Development)
AFLEG African Forest Law Enforcement and 
 Governance Process
AI Appreciative Inquiry
ANR Agence Nationale de Renseignements 
 (National Intelligence Agency)
CAIG Centre d’Animation et d’Information pour la 
 Gouvernance Forestière 
 (Centre of Leadership and Information for Forest 
 Governance)
CCGF Comité Consultatif pour la Gouvernance Forestière 
 (Consultative Committee for Forest Governance)
CCPE Comité de Coordination des Peuples Ekonda 
 (Ekonda Peoples Coordinating Committee)
CDV Comité de Dialogue et de Vigilance 
 (Dialogue and Vigilance Committee)
CESI Community Empowerment & Social Inclusion
CMO Comité des Minorités Opprimées 
 (Committee of Oppressed Minorities)
COMIFAC Conférence des Ministres en Charge des Forêts 
 d’Afrique Centrale 
 (Central African Forest Commission)
CSO Civil society organisation
DGM Direction Générale de Migration 
 (Directorate-General for Migration)
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EU European Union
FLEGT Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade
IEC Information, Education and Communication
ITB Industries de Transformation des Bois 
 (Wood Processing Industries)
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
MSC Most Significant Change
MSP Multi-stakeholder process
NPM New Public Management
NRM Natural Resource Management
PREM Poverty Reduction & Economic Management Network
REBOGOF Réseau pour la Bonne Gouvernance Forestière 
 (Provincial Network for Good Forest Governance)
REPEQ Réseau des Pygmées de l’Equateur 
 (Equator Pygmies Network)
SODEFOR Société de Développement Forestier 
 (Forest Development Corporation)
SSC Société pour la Solidarité et la Conservation 
 (Society for Solidarity and Conservation)
SVBC Strengthening Voices for Better Choices
UDME Union pour le Développement des Minorités Ekonda 
 (Union for the Development of Ekonda Minorities)
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
WB The World Bank
WI Wageningen International
WRI World Resources Institute
iii
Summary
Good forest governance is an increasingly important topic for 
stakeholders in many different settings around the world. Two of the 
best-known international initiatives to improve forest governance are 
the regional Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) min-
isterial processes supported by the World Bank, and the European 
Union’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) 
Action Plan.
Designed to support and complement such initiatives, the IUCN 
project “Strengthening Voices for Better Choices” (SVBC) is piloting 
improved forest governance arrangements in six countries in Africa, 
Asia and South America. In the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), one of three project countries in Africa, SVBC has created 
multi-stakeholder platforms at local, territorial and provincial levels 
for this purpose.
In 2008, Wageningen International launched a research 
programme on “Multi-stakeholder Processes in Governing for 
Sustainability”. Its objectives include developing new insights and 
methodologies to analyse and support governance in sustainable 
natural resource management.
Wageningen International and IUCN joined forces in Bikoro terri-
tory of Equator province, DRC, to study four questions:
 What is good forest governance according to the stakeholders 
involved at different levels in SVBC?
 What type of accountability arrangements are needed for im-
proved forest governance? 
 What potential do the structures established by SVBC have to 
improve forest governance and, in particular, accountability?
 What are the implications for analysing forest governance and 
accountability in other contexts, including interventions and the 
action research needed to strengthen them?
This report provides some answers to these questions, as well 
as recommendations for IUCN’s approach and for further action 
research on accountability arrangements.
Table 1 Stakeholder concerns in forest governance, Equator province
Platform Issue
Local   Being able to denounce harmful practices to responsive public 
authorities
  Equity in sharing forest revenues and resources among the 
local population
  Conflicts managed locally without intervention by the provincial 
court
Territorial The above issues, plus
  A coherent regulatory framework that guides stakeholder 
interventions in the forest sector
  Adequate law enforcement
  Transparency in tax collection and expenditure
Provincial   Equity in sharing forest revenues and resources by the local 
population
  Transparency in tax collection and expenditure
All levels   Civil society participation in decision making
  Acceptance of the forest law as a binding set of rules
  Decentralisation of tax collection and expenditure
  Information, education and communication (IEC)
Answers to the research questions
Table 1 lists the important issues in good forest governance as 
identified by SVBC’s stakeholders.
Some of these issues can be addressed by the platforms 
created with IUCN’s support, but others are beyond the project’s 
control. These include decentralisation, the gaps in the regulatory 
framework, the exclusion of health and education agencies from the 
social contract (cahier des charges) between timber companies and 
local populations, the energy crisis in Kinshasa (DRC’s capital), and 
a failing justice sector which is weakening respect for human rights.
The study also revealed that public sector performance in forest 
governance is weak. So too is the performance of civil society, giv-
ing timber companies, charcoal producers and artisanal loggers a 
free hand to exploit forest resources as they wish.
Three entry points were identified for creating the necessary ac-
countability arrangements:
 Supporting community-level committees in denouncing harmful 
and illegal forest exploitation practices, as well as asking public 
authorities to become more answerable to these complaints. 
This support should come from the territorial consultative com-
mittee and provincial network established under SVBC.
 Increasing transparency in forest tax collection and expenditure 
by the public sector. Timber companies have suggested that 
they record all tax, royalty and licence payments, and that these 
figures are then compared with those supplied by local authori-
ties. Civil society organisations (CSOs) have supported this idea.
 Strengthening monitoring of the social contract and the imple-
mentation of concession management plans by timber compa-
nies. Two accountability arrangements are possible here. One is 
to have civil society organisations ask government to account for 
effective monitoring of the contracts and their implementation; 
the other is for CSOs to seek a role as independent observers.
The potential of the platforms created by IUCN depends on 
three elements: their internal performance, the intervention strate-
gies they adopt, and their design:
 The platforms only recently became operational, and must tackle 
various internal performance bottlenecks before they can contrib-
ute fully to the forest governance regime. These include a lack of 
representativeness; the weak capacity of some CSO members 
for effective participation; the weak capacity of government; and 
the dependence of all members on IUCN for various needs.
 The local platforms have contributed considerably to reducing 
conflict within local populations, and between them and timber 
companies. Both the local and the territorial platforms play 
important roles in disseminating information on forest issues and 
raising awareness of harmful forest practices. Creating vertical 
linkages between the platforms is an important strategy to de-
velop further, as is continuing the dialogue between stakeholders 
in each platform. These two strategies are important both for 
strengthening forest governance and for designing social ac-
countability relations.
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 SVBC has engaged with timber companies who obtained con-
cession titles after DRC’s 2002 moratorium on the allocation, ex-
tension and renewal of these titles. Three of the four companies 
active in Bikoro lost their titles after a national review of conces-
sions in 2008, including two companies participating in SVBC, 
Leyda and ITB.* The issue here is to what extent IUCN took the 
2002 moratorium into account when SVBC began in 2005.
 DRC’s 2006 Constitution foresees the creation of local govern-
ments at the sector level, under the supervision of the territorial 
administration. As decentralisation progresses from the province 
to autonomous sector governments, the territorial platform 
created by IUCN will have to be transformed into a sectoral 
platform when local elections are held at this lower level.
The DRC case study illustrates that good forest governance can 
be socially constructed by a multi-stakeholder process. It requires 
a systems perspective to deal with uncertainty and complexity, and 
it must take into account local norms, values and perceptions of 
good governance; the rules, regulations and structures necessary to 
legitimise action; and the effectiveness of those actions in improving 
forest governance.
The case study analysed the three potential social accountabil-
ity relations identified against eight criteria of potential and quality 
drawn from the literature (such as the legitimate power of CSOs to 
sanction public sector performance; the degree of institutionalisa-
tion by government of decisions made in the territorial and provincial 
platforms; transparency; and the responsiveness of government to 
questions from CSOs and the private sector) and concluded that 
other criteria are also important. These include respect for human 
rights as a minimum condition for citizens and CSOs to denounce 
illegal forest exploitation practices; the existence of a legal and oper-
ational framework that is generally accepted and provides practical 
guidelines for law enforcement; the importance of not only design-
ing social accountability relations at one administrative level but also 
ensuring linkages between different administrative levels; the design 
of accountability relations where local governments with an elected 
council, mandate and budget are in place; and the particular role 
and position of the private sector in accountability relations.
An ideal process of action learning for improved forest govern-
ance would require more than the two weeks of field work available 
for this study. It would allow enough time for all stakeholders to 
jointly assess, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate forest govern-
ance and accountability relations. Facilitating a dialogue across 
vertical linkages and in multi-stakeholder settings would contribute 
towards new perspectives on good forest governance, leading in 
turn to new ideas and strategies for improving governance.
Recommendations for IUCN
 Strategic design
IUCN should review the role of the private sector in the strategic 
design of SVBC, and consider working with companies who 
have the legal right to operate in Bikoro territory. It should also 
revisit the appropriate administrative levels for multi-stakeholder 
dialogue and action, aligning them with levels that have a politi-
cal, administrative and financial mandate for forest governance.
 Promoting improved forest governance and social 
accountability relations
After identifying forest governance issues in Equator province, 
the next step is to reconvene stakeholders to agree on priority 
issues. This will help them to set their own good-enough forest 
governance agendas for action. Each agenda should include the 
design of sound social accountability relations responding to the 
issues and constraints identified in this study.
 Implications for intervention strategies
Promoting improved forest governance arrangements and de-
signing social accountability relations will require the platforms to 
reorient their strategies. IUCN’s help will be needed to promote 
dialogue and communication between different stakeholders at 
each level, as well as between the different levels. This will mean 
more intensive facilitation of general assemblies at each level, 
as well as facilitating joint meetings for all three platforms. IUCN 
should continue its strategies of managing local conflict and dis-
seminating information.
It should be recognised that the multi-stakeholder structures put 
in place have yet to mature, and that IUCN will organise training to 
address issues of organisational performance.
Recommendations for future action research by 
Wageningen International
An ideal process of action learning and research on forest govern-
ance and accountability arrangements would allow enough time for 
all stakeholders to:
 Define good forest governance in their own context, including 
the accountability relations necessary to improve governance. 
Here context refers to different “locations” or intervention levels 
where forest governance decisions are made or forest resources 
exploited or traded. Good forest governance would be defined 
at each location, as it was done at the local, territorial and pro-
vincial levels in Equator province.
 Define a strategic agenda for improving forest governance at 
each location.
 Share these ideas among all locations or intervention levels, and 
agree on a joint action agenda, including the accountability rela-
tions that need to be established.
 Implement the agenda at each level and ensure vertical linkages 
(bottom-up and top-down communication and alignment).
 Bring all levels together to review progress in improving forest 
governance and (re)define the action agenda as necessary.
 Continue this circle of action learning.
This process would involve more than a short field visit, and would 
include workshops at different locations and intervention levels, as 
well as exchanges allowing the dialogue to span those locations.
Important issues to take into consideration during such an action 
learning process are: treating forest governance both as a social 
construct and as a system, and identifying issues beyond the con-
trol or influence of those involved in the action-learning process.
Besides assessing existing and desirable accountability relations 
against a set of criteria, it would be interesting to know to what 
extent those relations represent a promising development strategy, 
and contribute to developing capacity, correcting market and state 
failures in natural resources management, and reducing poverty.
* After the 2008 review, IUCN ceased working with Leyda, but has remained 
engaged with ITB (which continues to operate with the special permission of the Min-
istry of Environment). IUCN has also invited the timber company SODEFOR, which 
retained its title, to participate in the platforms.
vRésumé
La bonne gouvernance forestière est un sujet de plus en plus 
important pour les différentes parties prenantes dans de nombreux 
endroits du monde. Deux des initiatives internationales les plus 
connues pour améliorer la gouvernance forestière sont les pro-
cessus ministériels FLEG (« Forest Law Enforcement and Gover-
nance ») soutenus par la Banque mondiale, et le plan d’action de 
l’Union européenne pour l’application des réglementations forestiè-
res, gouvernance et échanges commerciaux FLEGT (« Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade »).
Conçu pour soutenir et compléter ces initiatives, le projet SVBC 
de l’UICN (« Strengthening Voices for Better Choices ») pilote 
actuellement des régimes améliorés de gouvernance forestière dans 
six pays d’Afrique, d’Asie et d’Amérique du Sud. En République 
Démocratique du Congo (RDC), l’un des trois projets en Afrique, 
le SVBC a créé à cet effet des plateformes multiparticipatives aux 
niveaux local, territorial et provincial.
En 2008, Wageningen International a lancé un programme de 
recherche sur les « processus multiparticipatifs dans la gouver-
nance pour une gestion durable ». Ses objectifs comprennent le 
développement de nouvelles perspectives et méthodologies pour 
analyser et soutenir la gouvernance dans la gestion durable des 
ressources naturelles.
Wageningen International et l’UICN ont uni leurs forces dans 
le territoire de Bikoro de la Province de l’Equateur, en RDC, pour 
étudier quatre questions:
 Qu’est-ce que la bonne gouvernance forestière selon les diffé-
rentes parties prenantes impliquées à différents niveaux dans le 
projet SVBC?
 Quels genres de régimes de reddition de comptes sont-ils né-
cessaires pour améliorer la gouvernance forestière?
 Quels sont les potentiels que les structures mises en places par 
le SVBC doivent améliorer dans la gouvernance forestière, et en 
particulier en ce qui concerne la responsabilité?
 Quelles sont les implications de l’analyse de la gouvernance 
forestière et de la responsabilité dans d’autres contextes, y com-
pris les interventions et actions de recherches nécessaires pour 
les renforcer?
Ce rapport fourni quelques réponses à ces questions, ainsi que 
des recommandations pour l’approche de l’UICN et de toute autre 
action de recherche sur les régimes de responsabilité.
Réponses aux questions de la recherche
Le Cadre 1 décrit les principales préoccupations de la bonne gou-
vernance identifiées par les parties prenantes du projet SVBC. 
Certains de ces sujets peuvent être traités par les plateformes 
crées avec le soutien de l’UICN, mais d’autres dépassent le cadre 
des compétences du projet. Cela inclut la décentralisation, les failles 
dans le cadre des réglementations, l’exclusion des agences de 
santé et d’éducation du contrat social (« cahier des charges »), la 
crise énergétique à Kinshasa (la capitale de la RDC), et un secteur 
judicaire défaillant qui affaiblit le respect des droits de l’homme.
Cadre 1 Les préoccupations des parties prenantes au sujet de la gouvernance 
forestière, dans la province de l’Equateur
Plateform Sujets
Locale   Etre capable de dénoncer des pratiques dommageables à des 
autorités publiques réactives
  Equité dans le partage des revenus de la forêt et des ressources 
parmi la population locale
  Conflits gérés localement sans l’intervention d’une cour provinciale
Territoriale Les sujets mentionnés ci-dessus, plus
  Un cadre de régulation cohérent pour guider les interventions des 
parties prenantes dans le secteur forestier
  Une application adéquate de la loi
  Transparence en ce qui concerne la perception des impôts et les 
dépenses
Provinciale   Equité dans le partage des revenus de la forêt et des ressources par 
la population locale
  Transparence en ce qui concerne la perception des impôts et les 
dépenses
Tous les 
niveaux
  Participation de la société civile aux processus de prise de décisions
  Acceptation de la loi forestière en tant qu’ensemble de règles devant 
être respectées par tous
  Décentralisation de la perception des impôts et des dépenses
  Information, éducation et communication (IEC)
L’étude a également révélé que les performances du secteur 
public dans le domaine de la gouvernance forestière sont faibles. 
C’est également le cas des performances de la société civile, qui 
laisse les mains libres aux sociétés d’exploitation forestière, aux 
producteurs de charbon et aux exploitants artisanaux pour exploiter 
les ressources de la forêt à leur guise.
Trois points d’entrée ont été identifiés pour créer les régimes de 
responsabilité nécessaires:
 Soutenir les comités au niveau local pour dénoncer les pratiques 
d’exploitation forestière dommageables et illégales, et deman-
der aux autorités publiques d’apporter plus de réponses à ces 
plaintes. Ce soutien devrait venir du comité consultatif territorial 
et du réseau provincial mis en place sous le SVBC.
 Accroitre la transparence en ce qui concerne la perception des 
impôts forestiers et les dépenses du secteur public. Les sociétés 
d’exploitation du bois ont suggéré d’enregistrer tous les impôts, 
royalties et paiements de licences, et que ses chiffres soient 
ensuite comparés à ceux fournis par les autorités locales. Les 
organisations de la société civile (OSC) ont soutenu cette idée.
 Renforcer le contrôle du contrat social entre les populations 
locales et les sociétés d’exploitation forestière, ainsi que l’appli-
cation de la gestion des plans de concessions par les sociétés 
d’exploitation forestière. Deux régimes de responsabilité sont 
possibles ici. L’un d’eux est de faire en sorte que les organisa-
tions de la société civile demandent au gouvernement de se 
responsabiliser pour un contrôle effectif des contrats et de leur 
mise en œuvre; l’autre consiste à faire en sorte que les OSC 
cherchent à avoir un rôle d’observateurs indépendants.
Le potentiel des plateformes créées par l’UICN dépend de trois 
éléments: leur performance interne, les stratégies d’intervention 
qu’elles adoptent, et la manière dont elles sont conçues:
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 Les plateformes ne sont devenues opérationnelles que récem-
ment, et elles doivent faire face à de nombreux obstacles inter-
nes de performance avant de pouvoir contribuer pleinement au 
régime de gouvernance forestière. Ceci comprend un manque 
de représentativité, une faible capacité de certains membres 
des OSC à participer de manière efficace, la faible capacité du 
gouvernement, et la dépendance de tous les membres vis-à-vis 
de l’UICN pour régler de nombreux besoins.
 Les plateformes locales ont considérablement contribué à 
réduire les conflits au sein des populations locales, ainsi qu’entre 
elles et les sociétés d’exploitation forestière. Les plateformes 
locales aussi bien que les territoriales jouent des rôles importants 
dans la diffusion des informations sur les sujets touchant la forêt 
et pour la sensibilisation sur les pratiques forestières domma-
geables. La création de liens verticaux entre les plateformes est 
une stratégie importante à développer à l’avenir, car elle permet 
de poursuivre le dialogue entre les parties prenantes de chaque 
plateforme. Ces deux stratégies sont toutes deux importantes 
car elles renforcent la gouvernance forestière et la conception 
des relations de responsabilité sociale.
  Le SVBC s’est engagé avec des sociétés d’exploitation fores-
tière qui ont obtenu des titres de concession après le moratoire 
de 2002 en RDC sur les allocations, extensions et renouvelle-
ment de ces titres. Trois des quatre sociétés actives à Bikoro 
ont perdu leurs titres après la révision nationale des concessions 
en 2008, y compris deux sociétés qui participaient au SVBC: 
Leyda et ITB.* Le problème ici est de savoir dans quelle mesure 
l’UICN a pris en compte le moratoire de 2002 quand le SVBC a 
commencé en 2005.
 La constitution de 2006 de la RDC prévoit la création de gou-
vernements locaux au niveau des secteurs, sous la supervision 
de l’administration territoriale. Alors que la décentralisation 
progresse de la province vers les gouvernements de secteurs, la 
plateforme créée par l’UICN devra être transformée en plate-
forme sectorielle quand les élections seront organisées à ce 
niveau inférieur.
L’étude de cas de la RDC illustre que la bonne gouvernance 
forestière peut être socialement construite par un processus mul-
tiparticipatif. Ceci doit faire appel à une perspective de systèmes 
pour faire face à l’incertitude et à la complexité, et doit prendre en 
considération les normes locales, les valeurs et les perceptions de 
la bonne gouvernance, ainsi que les règles, règlements et structures 
nécessaires pour légitimer cette action, et l’efficacité de ces actions 
pour améliorer la gouvernance forestière.
L’étude de cas a analysé les trois relations de responsabilité 
sociale potentielles identifiées parmi huit critères de potentiel et 
de qualité tirés de la documentation existante (comme le pouvoir 
légitime des OSC de sanctionner la performance du secteur social, 
la transparence, et la réactivité du gouvernement aux questions 
des OSC et du secteur privé), et conclut que d’autres critères sont 
également importants. Cela comprend le respect des droits de 
l’homme comme condition minimum pour les citoyens et les OSC 
afin de dénoncer les pratiques illégales d’exploitation forestière, 
l’existence d’un cadre juridique et opérationnel qui soit accepté par 
tous et qui offre des lignes directrices pratiques pour le respect des 
lois. L’important est de ne pas seulement concevoir des relations 
de responsabilité sociale à un niveau administratif mais également 
d’assurer des liens entre les différents niveaux administratifs, et de 
concevoir des relations de responsabilité là où des gouvernements 
locaux sont en place jouissant de conseils, mandats et budgets 
élus, et le rôle particulier et la position du secteur privé dans les 
relations de responsabilité.
Un processus idéal d’apprentissage actif pour une gouver-
nance forestière améliorée aurait également besoin de plus que 
les deux semaines de travail sur le terrain dont disposait cette 
étude. Cela permettrait de donner suffisamment de temps aux 
parties prenantes pour estimer, planifier, mettre en place, contrôler 
et évaluer conjointement la gouvernance forestière et les rela-
tions de responsabilité. Faciliter le dialogue au travers des liens 
verticaux et grâce aux processus multipartites contribuerait à 
avancer vers de nouvelles perspectives de bonne gouvernance, 
qui mèneraient à leur tour à de nouvelles idées et stratégies pour 
améliorer la gouvernance.
Recommandations pour l’UICN
 Conception stratégique 
L’UICN devrait revoir le rôle du secteur privé dans la 
conception stratégique du SVBC, et considérer la possibilité 
de travailler avec des sociétés qui ont l’autorisation légale 
d’opérer sur le territoire de Bikoro. L’UICN devrait également 
revoir les niveaux administratifs appropriés pour un dialogue et 
une action multipartite, en les alignant sur les niveaux qui ont 
un mandat politique, administratif et financier pour la gouver-
nance forestière. 
 Promouvoir des relations améliorées de gouvernance forestière 
et de responsabilité sociale
Après avoir identifié les sujets de gouvernance forestière dans 
la province de l’Équateur, la prochaine étape consiste à réunir à 
nouveau les parties prenantes pour les mettre d’accord sur les 
sujets prioritaires. Ceci les aidera à établir leurs propres plans 
d’action de suffisamment bonne gouvernance forestière. Cha-
que agenda devrait inclure la création de relations de responsa-
bilité sociale solides qui répondent aux préoccupations et aux 
contraintes identifiées dans cette étude.
  Implications pour des stratégies d’intervention
La promotion de régimes améliorés de gouvernance forestière 
et la création de relations de responsabilité sociale demande-
ront une réorientation des stratégies des plateformes. L’aide 
de l’UICN sera nécessaire pour promouvoir le dialogue et la 
communication entre les différentes parties prenantes à chaque 
niveau, ainsi qu’entre les différents niveaux. Ceci exigera de 
faciliter de manière plus intensive l’organisation d’assemblées 
générales à chaque niveau, ainsi que d’arranger des rencontres 
conjointes pour les trois plateformes. L’UICN devra continuer 
à appliquer ses stratégies de gestion de conflits locaux et de 
diffusion d’information.
Il faut noter que les structures multipartites mises en places ne 
sont pas encore arrivées à maturité, et que l’UICN devra organiser 
des formations pour traiter les problèmes relatifs à la performance 
organisationnelle.
* Après la révision de 2008, l’UICN a arrêté de travailler avec Leyda, mais a continué 
sa relation avec ITB (qui continue à opérer avec une permission spéciale du Ministère 
de l’Environnement). L’UICN a également invité la compagnie d’exploitation forestière 
SODEFOR, qui a gardé son titre de concession, à participer aux plateformes.
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Recommandations pour des actions de recherche 
futures de la part de Wageningen International
Un processus idéal pour l’apprentissage actif et la recherche sur 
la gouvernance forestière et les régimes de responsabilité devrait 
donner suffisamment de temps à toutes les parties prenantes pour 
leur permettre de:
 Définir la bonne gouvernance dans leur propre contexte, y com-
pris les relations de responsabilité nécessaires pour améliorer la 
gouvernance. Dans ce cadre, le contexte fait référence aux diffé-
rentes « localisations » ou niveaux d’intervention où les décisions 
de gouvernance forestière sont prises ou les ressources fores-
tières exploitées ou commercialisées. La bonne gouvernance 
forestière devrait être définie dans chaque localisation, tout 
comme cela a été fait aux niveaux local, territorial et provincial 
dans la province de l’Equateur.
 Définir un agenda stratégique pour améliorer la gouvernance 
forestière dans chaque localisation.
 Partager ces idées avec tous les localisations ou niveaux d’inter-
vention, et se mettre d’accord sur un plan d’action commun, y 
compris sur les relations de responsabilité qui ont besoin d’être 
mises en place.
 Appliquer le plan d’actiona à tous les niveaux et s’assurer des 
liens verticaux (communication et alignement du bas vers le haut 
et du haut vers le bas).
 Réunir tous les niveaux pour faire une révision des avancements 
réalisés dans l’amélioration de la gouvernance forestière et  
(re)définir les plans d’action quand c’est nécessaire.
 Poursuivre le cercle d’apprentissage actif.
Ce processus devra comprendre plus qu’une brève visite sur le 
terrain, et devra inclure des ateliers dans les différentes localisations 
et niveaux d’intervention, ainsi que des échanges permettant jeter 
un pont entre ces différentes localisations.
Des points importants à prendre en considération pendant un tel 
processus d’apprentissage actif sont: traiter la gouvernance fores-
tière et la construction social comme un système unique, et identifier 
les problèmes qui se situent au-delà du contrôle ou de l’influence de 
ceux qui sont impliqués dans le processus d’apprentissage actif.
Parallèlement à l’évaluation des relations de responsabilité 
existantes et souhaitables conformément à un ensemble de critères 
établis, il serait intéressant de connaître à quel point ces relations 
représentent une stratégie de développement prometteuse, et 
contribuent au développement des capacités, à corriger le marché 
et les failles de l’état en ce qui concerne la gestion des ressources 
naturelles, et à réduire la pauvreté.
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11 Introduction
The research questions
Good forest governance is an increasingly important topic for 
stakeholders in many different settings around the world. Two of 
the best-known initiatives to improve forest governance are the 
regional Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) ministe-
rial processes supported by the World Bank, and the European 
Union’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) 
Action Plan.
Designed to support and complement such initiatives, the IUCN 
project “Strengthening Voices for Better Choices” (SVBC) is pilot-
ing improved forest governance arrangements in six countries in 
Africa, Asia and South America. The project is helping to establish 
multi-stakeholder processes in which government, civil society and 
the private sector jointly work towards better forest governance. 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), one of three project 
countries in Africa, SVBC has created multi-stakeholder platforms 
at local, territorial and provincial levels for this purpose. These are 
being piloted in Bikoro territory of Equator province.
In 2008, Wageningen International (WI) launched a research 
programme on “Multi-stakeholder Processes in Governing for 
Sustainability”. Its objectives are to: strengthen the learning capaci-
ties of its staff in applying social change methodologies and tools 
in field environments; develop capacity-strengthening materials 
which enable staff to intervene in complex and transitional societal 
processes; and develop new insights and methodologies for ana-
lysing and supporting governance in sustainable natural resource 
management.
WI and IUCN joined forces in Bikoro territory to study four 
questions:
 What is good forest governance according to the stakeholders 
involved at different levels in SVBC?
 What type of accountability arrangements are needed for im-
proved forest governance?
 What potential do the structures established by SVBC have to 
improve forest governance and, in particular, accountability?
 What are the implications for analysing forest governance and 
accountability in other contexts, including interventions and the 
action research needed to strengthen them?
This report provides some answers to these questions, as well 
as recommendations for IUCN’s approach and for further action 
research on accountability arrangements.
Methodology
Research principles and tools
The research was intended as a joint learning process involving 
IUCN’s coordinators in both DRC and Brussels, as well as other 
local stakeholders. The aim was to document their perspectives on 
forest governance rather than the view of Wageningen International 
itself. The role of WI was that of research designer and facilitator.
The research adopted an action research methodology based 
on SVBC’s bottom-up approach to addressing forest governance. 
Starting at the local (community) level, the project aims to create the 
dialogue and momentum necessary to bring about change at higher 
administrative levels.
The action research phase lasted two weeks, during which 
separate one-day workshops were held with the platforms operat-
ing at the community level – the Dialogue and Vigilance Committees 
(CDVs); the platform at the territorial level – the Consultative Com-
mittee for Forest Governance (CCGF); and the provincial platform 
– the Provincial Network for Good Forest Governance (REBOGOF). 
Besides these meetings, interviews were held with resource people 
representing different stakeholder groups (see Annexes).
The main facilitation methods used to help workshop partici-
pants jointly elaborate their future agenda were most significant 
change and elements of appreciative inquiry (see Box 1). The 
advantage of these methods is that they are based on monitoring 
or evaluating events using storytelling rather than preset indicators 
or closed questions. They also engage people in a joint learning 
process to celebrate and reinforce successes, rather than to try to 
overcome problems. So both tools fit well into an action research 
framework where the stakeholders involved will be collaborating in 
the future.
Box 1 Most Significant Change and Appreciative Inquiry
The most significant change (MSC) technique is a form of participatory monitoring 
and evaluation. It is participatory because it involves stakeholders both in deciding 
the types of change to be recorded and in analysing the data. It is a form of moni-
toring because it occurs throughout the programme cycle and provides information 
to help people manage the programme. It contributes to evaluation because it 
provides data on impact and outcomes that can be used to assess the performance 
of the programme as a whole.
In essence, MSC involves collecting significant change stories from the field, 
and systematically selecting the most instructive of these stories by panels of des-
ignated stakeholders or staff. These people are initially involved in “searching” for 
project impact. Once the changes have been captured, various people sit together, 
read aloud the stories and discuss in detail the value of the reported changes. 
When MSC is applied successfully, whole teams begin to focus their attention on 
impact (Davies & Dart 2005).
Appreciative Inquiry (AI) is a form of action research that attempts to create 
new theories, ideas and images to help the development of a system (Cooperrider 
& Whitney 1987). The key data innovation of AI is the collection of people’s stories 
of something at its best. These are then discussed collectively to create new ideas 
or images that will facilitate developmental change in the group discussing them. AI 
is often applied in practice using the 4-D model:
 Discover – people discover the times when the organisation or system is 
at its best. These stories are told as richly as possible. 
 Dream – the dream phase is where people are encouraged to envision the 
organisation or system at its best. 
 Design – people identify strategies or ways of realising the dream.
 Destiny – the final phase is to implement the changes.
2The research methodology in practice
In practice, notwithstanding the joint learning 
approach, nearly all of the information obtained in 
the field was collected and analysed by WI. The 
IUCN coordinator in Brussels could not join the 
field work, and the project coordinator in DRC 
spent much of his time in the field working on lo-
gistical and administrative issues. As a result this 
report mostly reflects the conclusions of WI.
The bottom-up approach was implemented 
as planned. The field work started with a work-
shop with CDVs, who later joined the territorial 
workshop as members of the CCGF. Represent-
atives from both the CDVs and the CCGF joined 
the provincial workshop.
The MSC and AI approaches were followed 
as far as possible, but field realities meant they 
were not used to the same extent in each work-
shop. The workshop programmes as followed in 
the field are given in the Annexes.
In the first workshop, the MSC and AI ap-
proaches proved helpful in gaining an overall pic-
ture of governance and accountability. But using 
the same tools in the territorial workshop would 
have generated similar information, because half 
of the participants were CDV members. Similarly, 
a third of the participants in the provincial work-
shop had attended the previous workshops.
Different methodologies were used to 
strengthen vertical linkages between the three 
levels, because the CDVs, the CCGF and the 
provincial network had not met together before. 
The workshops also made it possible to probe 
the results of earlier meetings, though in most 
cases the time available for collecting information 
was limited to no more than six hours.
The research methodology generated much 
information on the first research question, but 
was less successful in assessing the accountabil-
ity arrangements needed for better forest govern-
ance. For one thing, accountability is a difficult concept to address 
directly in a short workshop. Also, the governance platforms have 
only just started functioning and are still gaining experience in this 
field. However, accountability was directly addressed by a subgroup 
in the provincial workshop, as well as in the territorial workshop.
The potential of the structures created by SVBC for improving 
forest governance and accountability was partially discussed in the 
workshops, in terms of formulating dreams and recommendations 
for governance. Other information was drawn from semi-structured 
interviews with key informants. These informants also provided 
ideas and information on forest law, rules, regulations and practices; 
the forest governance context; the performance of the project plat-
forms; and the options for improving forest governance.
Structure of the report
This report is organised as follows:
 Chapter 2 provides an overview of the main forest governance 
issues in DRC, and in Bikoro in particular. The SVBC project is 
discussed against this background – its achievements and its 
potential for adding value to efforts to improve forest governance 
and strengthen social accountability relations. The second part 
of the chapter provides the basic elements for answering the 
third research question, namely the potential of the structures 
put in place by IUCN to improve forest governance and, in par-
ticular, accountability.
 Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the first and second research ques-
tions, beginning with a short overview of the relevant literature, 
followed by a presentation and discussion of the research 
findings and their implications. The chapters conclude with a 
detailed answer to each question.
 Chapter 5 reflects upon forest governance, accountability and 
the action research methodology used in the study, drawing les-
sons for future case studies.
 Chapter 6 concludes the report by recapitulating the answers 
to the research questions and providing recommendations for 
IUCN’s approach and for future action research.
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32  Forest governance and 
SVBC – the context
This chapter discusses the forest governance context in DRC and 
how IUCN is intervening in it. Important issues are the 2002 for-
est law and the status of concessions, the livelihood strategies of 
Bikoro’s inhabitants, and the political decentralisation process that 
began in 2006. IUCN is intervening through the creation of multi-
stakeholder platforms at local, territorial and provincial levels.
Forest concessions and the forest law
DRC’s 2002 forest law states that all forests belong to the state and 
can be classified into forest reserves, protected forests and produc-
tion forests (Government of DRC 2002). Timber companies obtain 
concession rights from the Environment Ministry as embodied in 
a concession contract. These comprise a concession manage-
ment plan and a social contract (cahier des charges) specifying the 
compensation to be paid to the local population who, by traditional 
law, claim ownership of the land and forest. The social contract also 
covers development of socio-economic infrastructure, such as road 
construction and maintenance; improvement of schools, health cen-
tres and their equipment; and other land and water transport facilities.
Although the law states that the concession management plan and 
social contract are part of the concession contract, an implementing 
decree is currently lacking that clearly describes the rights and obliga-
tions of the timber company, government and the local population. In 
practice, timber companies are negotiating social contracts directly 
with the local population, without any government intervention.
Timber companies pay royalties on the size of their concession, 
logging taxes, export taxes, and deforestation and reforestation 
taxes. Despite the 2006 Constitution, which stipulates that taxes 
are to be collected by decentralised autonomous local governments 
(Government of DRC 2006), all forest-related taxes are paid directly 
to the national Treasury. Local authorities are entitled to retain 15% 
of these taxes and provincial governments 25%. These revenues 
are earmarked for basic social infrastructure. As yet, however, no 
funds have been transferred to provincial or local governments 
because they still lack the necessary legal authority and rights.
In 2002, the government declared a moratorium on the alloca-
tion, extension or renewal of forest concession titles. This was re-
newed in 2005. In 2008 a national commission reviewed all existing 
concession titles, officially recognising 46 of 156 titles (Government 
of DRC 2008).
In Bikoro, four timber companies holding five concession titles 
are currently active on 733,164 hectares (ha), roughly 53% of the 
territory’s area (see Maps 1 and 2 opposite).¹ All of the companies 
in Bikoro obtained their concession titles after the 2002 moratorium. 
The 2008 commission legalised the title of only one company in 
Bikoro, SODEFOR. It did not reconfirm the titles of ITB or Leyda, 
who were participating in SVBC, leading IUCN to cease work-
ing with Leyda. Because ITB continued operating with the special 
permission of the Environment Ministry, IUCN decided to remain 
engaged with the company.
ITB entered the area in 2005 and has made most progress in 
negotiating social contracts with local communities. While doing so 
it has built a loading beach on Lake Tumba and started logging. The 
other companies are still preparing their concession management 
plans and have yet to start negotiating social contracts.
Population and forest issues
Bikoro had an estimated population of 245,000 in 2004, at a 
density of 17.7 people/km². Both Bikoro and the capital of Equa-
tor province, Mbandaka (700,000 inhabitants), have small markets 
and limited economic activity. Households cultivate their own food 
crops (cassava) using mainly slash-and-burn practices, and depend 
entirely on forest products for three months every year. On the 
Mbandaka–Bikoro axis, IUCN’s zone of intervention, the average 
household income is an estimated US$70/year (ICC 2004). This 
means that Bikoro’s population depends heavily on subsistence 
agriculture and forest resources.
Traditionally local communities consider themselves the own-
ers of the land, and each family or clan (or both) has its own land. 
Slash-and-burn cultivation causes many land disputes amongst 
families and clans because land boundaries are not always clear.
Timber companies obtain forest concession rights on these 
same lands and negotiate a social contract directly with their in-
habitants. Part of the social contract deals with social infrastructure 
and part is direct compensation, i.e. a stumpage fee, to the clan or 
family who claims traditional land ownership.
In the prevailing conditions a family or clan does not identify itself 
as belonging to a community or a village. Each clan is more inter-
ested in obtaining its own share of resources rather than working 
towards the creation of social infrastructure servicing more than one 
clan. On occasion traditional chiefs have even dismantled existing 
infrastructure and used the parts for their own benefit.²
Organizations such as Greenpeace have claimed that timber 
companies take advantage of this situation and that, “in exchange 
for extracting wood worth many hundreds of thousands of dollars, 
companies may give communities gifts worth as little as $100 in 
total. Once logging starts, the provision of services negotiated for by 
the community, such as school buildings, is often either derisory or 
not delivered at all” (Greenpeace 2007).
The negotiations between traditional chiefs and the timber 
companies can cause many conflicts. Until now government has 
not been involved in the social contracting process, even though it 
is responsible for staffing schools and health centres.³
¹ SODEFOR obtained a title in 2003 for 86,000 ha; ITB obtained titles in 2004 and 
2005 for 294,700 ha in two concessions, including a part in Igende territory; Leyda 
obtained a title in 2005 for 123,000 ha; and Scibois a title for 229,400 ha, including a 
part in Lukolela territory, in 2003.
² Source: interviews with informants. 
³ Twenty-five social contracts have been signed by local representatives and timber 
companies (information from IUCN).
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Map 1 Land cover map of DRC, based on the Vegetation 
Map of Africa prepared under the Global Land Cover 
2000 Project (http://bioval.jrc.ec.europa.eu/products/
glc2000/glc2000.php).
Map 2 Equator province, DRC. The province’s 
boundary follows the new political subdivisions 
introduced by the country’s 2006 Constitution.
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5Other governance issues to emerge from the workshop with the 
CDVs include:
 Since 2007 an increasing amount of timber has been harvested 
illegally to produce charcoal for sale in Kinshasa. A charcoal 
supply chain has emerged, controlled by influential stakeholders 
from Bikoro town, Mbandaka and Kinshasa. The timber is cut 
and processed by poor people with no other sources of income. 
Charcoal production increased at the same time as the transport 
network was extended to include ITB’s loading beach in Bikoro 
and a road between Mbandaka and Bikoro. The CDVs observe 
that producing charcoal is the most damaging forest use. Appro-
priate decrees to control production have yet to be issued and 
local people lack the power to tackle this issue by themselves.
 Artisanal logging is also seen as damaging to forests, though it 
has not spread as widely as charcoal production. Artisanal log-
gers produce timber mainly for local consumption.
 Trees (like the giant sapelli, Entandrophragma cylindricum) that 
support caterpillars and other non-timber products important 
for local livelihoods are being cut by timber companies, charcoal 
producers and artisanal loggers. These caterpillars are an impor-
tant source of protein for the local population for at least three 
months every year when food crops are ripening.
Decentralisation and forest governance
DRC’s 2006 Constitution envisions the creation of 26 provinces 
(including the city of Kinshasa), each with a parliament, plus the 
creation of local governments at the level of the town, commune (in 
urban areas), sector and traditional chiefdoms (rural areas), each 
with an elected council. These changes imply that local govern-
ments will have the mandate and financial responsibility to manage 
local development and resources. The provinces started functioning 
as autonomous entities in August 2008, but local governments have 
yet to be created at the sector level.
The author expects that local governments will be created in 
each of Bikoro’s three sectors, and that the territorial administration 
will continue to work as a deconcentrated entity. This means that it 
will represent central government in certain functions without having 
the status of a local government.
The most important effects of decentralisation on forest manage-
ment and planning are:
 Provinces will be responsible for administering 40% of the tax 
revenues currently collected by the Treasury. They will also have 
a budget for forest management. In future, local governments 
under the province will be able to claim 15% of tax revenues 
(with 25% going to the province and the remaining 60% to cen-
tral government).
 As at the national level, a consultative committee represent-
ing both the private and public sectors will be created at the 
provincial level. It will take the lead in drafting a provincial forest 
management plan.
 Both provincial and local governments will have the mandate, or-
ganization and operating procedures to formulate both strategic 
and annual development plans and budgets.
 Specific responsibilities devolved to local governments and rel-
evant to the forest sector include law enforcement, maintaining 
social infrastructure, and issuing permits and licences.
 Specific responsibilities devolved to the province and relevant 
to the forest sector are provincial forest programmes and their 
implementation in line with the national forest law. They also 
include enforcing laws, drafting provincial implementing decrees, 
and issuing permits and licences.
Table 2 outlines the expected situation after decentralisation in 
Equator province, including the allocation of responsibilities and 
mandates under the forest law. The table also locates the structures 
created under SVBC (CDVs, CCGF and provincial network) within 
this framework.
Table 2 Future decentralised entities, their responsibilities under the forest law, and the equivalent SVBC multi-stakeholder platforms
Future status under decentralisation Status under forest law SVBC project structure
Community/local Inhabitants or citizens of local government 
jurisdictions at the sector level
Negotiate social contracts with timber companies 
(schools, health centres, roads and compensation for clan 
representatives). The law is not clear about which parties should 
be involved in negotiating social contracts.
Dialogue and Vigilance Committees 
(CDVs)
Sector
(Three in Bikoro 
territory. Not yet 
created.)
Local government with autonomous status, 
devolved power and responsibilities, a local 
council elected by the population, and its own 
budget
Not mentioned in the forest law, but will play a key role 
in implementing and monitoring social contracts with 
timber companies because it will be responsible for social 
infrastructure. Also responsible for developing and implementing 
local development plans. The decentralization law stipulates that 
sector governments should collect all taxes, retaining 15% of the 
revenues for constructing and maintaining social infrastructure. 
The rest is to be transferred to the province (25%) and the 
centre (60%).
New structure to be created
Territory It is assumed that this will become a 
deconcentrated administrative entity
None. Neither the Constitution nor the forest law clarify the 
nature of the territory or its functions. As a deconcentrated entity 
it will only implement orders from national or provincial levels 
and will not have any political decision-making authority.
Consultative Committee (CCGF)
Province
(Officially operational 
since August 2008.)
Provincial government with a parliament. 
Autonomous status, devolved power and 
responsibilities, and its own budget since 
August 2008.
Responsible for drafting provincial laws and implementing 
decrees, and implementing provincial development plans, 
including a provincial forest management plan. Also responsible 
for land registration. A provincial consultative committee will be 
set up to advise on forest issues, including forest classification
Provincial network (REBOGOF)
Centre National government Responsible for drafting national forest law and implementing 
decrees; a national forest management plan; land registration; 
and tender procedures and concession contracts. A national 
consultative committee will provide advice as needed.
Not yet in place
6Strengthening Voices for Better Choices (SVBC)
Objectives and interventions
SVBC aims to identify and promote improved forest governance 
arrangements in partnership with government, civil society and 
the private sector. The project began in 2005 and will finish in July 
2009. It is working towards five main outcomes:
 Legal, institutional and economic obstacles to sustainable and 
equitable forest management identified in six priority countries. 
 New and innovative approaches to overcoming the obstacles to 
good forest governance pilot tested and assessed. 
 Selected representatives from government, civil society and the 
private sector have enhanced skills and knowledge for partici-
pating more effectively in the development and implementation 
of forest governance reforms.
 Awareness of, and commitment to, FLEG processes and action 
increased and sustained.
 Lessons learned are effectively captured, analysed and dissemi-
nated at local, national, regional and global levels.
One of the strategies followed by the SVBC project has been 
to support the creation of multi-stakeholder platforms at commu-
nity, territorial and provincial levels. The following sections briefly 
describe these platforms in relation to their objectives.
Community level
At the community¹ level in Bikoro, SVBC has supported the 
establishment and functioning of 32 Committees for Dialogue and 
Vigilance (CDVs). These have three main objectives:
 To identify and denounce actions harmful to forest conservation 
and development.
 To build mutually beneficial and harmonious relations between 
timber companies and surrounding communities.
 To draw up local development plans and monitor and evaluate 
their implementation.²
Besides these objectives, the CDVs solve conflicts of interest 
between community members and promote alternative livelihood 
strategies that are less harmful to forest resources.
CDV members include local customary chiefs, representa-
tives of informal associations and marginalized groups such as 
women and pygmies, the local elite (from the church, school, health 
centre and opinion leaders) and clan representatives. Some CDVs 
incorporate one village; others incorporate several. Each CDV has 
at most 12–15 members and meets every week. The CDVs are not 
a tripartite stakeholder platform (i.e. one representing government, 
civil society and the private sector), since they represent mainly 
users and owners of forest resources, as well as those who will 
benefit from social contracts signed with timber companies. They 
represent the local population in its dealings with timber companies 
and government. To date the CDVs have been cooperating with the 
timber company ITB.
Territorial level
SVBC has supported the creation of a Consultative Committee 
for Forest Governance (CCGF), officially recognized by Equator 
province in 2007. The CCGF operates as an association, with a 
General Assembly that sets its strategic priorities and an executive 
committee in charge of implementing the strategy. The charter of 
the CCGF lists the following objectives (CCGF 2008):
 To engage the private sector (timber companies), public admin-
istration and civil society in a dialogue that includes joint analysis 
and resolution of forest governance issues.
 To disseminate the forest law and related implementing decrees 
concerning (illegal) logging and trade in timber and non-timber 
products.
 To raise awareness of the importance of paying taxes and re-
specting local authorities.
 To promote local values of good forest governance and their 
observance during forest exploitation activities.
 To promote mediation as a strategy for resolving conflicts.
 To stimulate local communities to take care of themselves and 
their own development (self-reliance).
 To monitor the implementation of forest concession manage-
ment plans.
The CCGF has held one General Assembly since its creation.
The members of the CCGF include all CDVs well as the territorial 
administrator, timber companies and CSOs operating at the territo-
rial level (including churches and organisations representing women 
and pygmies).
Provincial level
In May 2008, Equator province officially recognized the Provincial 
Network for Good Forest Governance (REBOGOF). Like the CCGF, 
the provincial network aims to bring the public, private and civil sec-
tors together in a dialogue on forest governance issues.
The first meeting of the network coincided with WI’s field visit in 
June 2008. It has yet to develop a strategic plan.³
Achievements and added value of the platforms 
in forest governance 
Achievements in relation to objectives
By July 2008, 14 of the 32 CDVs had been active for 18 months. 
In line with their objectives, they have been contributing to mutu-
ally beneficial and harmonious relations between timber companies 
and local communities. Their objective of denouncing harmful ac-
tions needs more work and support, however. The CCGF and the 
provincial network need to provide the necessary support to CDVs 
in terms of discussing the nature of harmful practices and their 
illegality, and asking public officials to take action. Making public 
authorities more responsive to citizens also requires stronger vertical 
linkages between the different platforms.
The third objective assigned to the CDVs is unrealistic in the 
current circumstances, because no development plans are being 
prepared at the community level or by local authorities. The role of 
CDVs in this area may grow over the next few years as local gov-
ernments are established.
The main achievement of the CCGF is that it has succeeded 
in involving timber companies, government and civil society in a 
dialogue that goes beyond information exchange. But the CCGF 
is still in its formative stages. One General Assembly has been 
held to decide on its strategic priorities, namely constructing an ¹ The “community” is not well-defined. It may comprise one or more villages, 
and its relation to the sector is unclear. 
² Information provided by IUCN. Note that these objectives differ from those 
assigned to the CDVs in the charter of the CCGF. ³ Neither the charter nor the membership of the provincial network has been finalised.
7environmental information centre and radio station, raising environ-
mental awareness and promoting alternative livelihoods. These do 
not seem to reflect the objectives originally assigned to the CCGF 
under its charter (see above).
The territorial workshop in Bikoro revealed that the key roles of 
the CCGF are to:
 Provide a platform for exchanging information and opinions 
about the rights and obligations of public servants when sanc-
tioning people who have broken the law.
 Jointly explore different articles of the forest law and their impli-
cations for charcoal production and artisanal logging.
With considerable support from IUCN, the CCGF has suc-
ceeded in obtaining part of the loading beach rents paid by ITB to 
the territorial authority. With this money, the CCGF is building an 
environmental radio station. ITB has also promised to contribute to 
the station’s operating and maintenance costs.¹
The provincial network met for the first time during WI’s field visit, 
and has yet to develop its strategic plan. So it is not possible to as-
sess its added value for governance.
Key intervention strategies with future potential 
The following strategies create considerable added value in 
strengthening forest governance and accountability: 
 Conflict management at the local level. The CDVs and the 
CCGF have highlighted the positive effects of managing conflict 
at the community level, including strengthening the self-reliance 
of local populations and reducing their dependence on the 
provincial court of justice. This strategy is one of the successes 
of the SVBC project and should be continued.
 Disseminate information on laws and regulations related 
to forest governance. At all levels, workshop participants 
agreed that disseminating the forest law and related regulations, 
and educating citizens about their rights and obligations, remain 
necessary, despite the efforts of various organisations over the 
past few years (which appear to have left few tangible traces²). 
This strategy has also proved successful and should be contin-
ued. The environmental radio will make an invaluable contribu-
tion to its implementation.
 Strengthening the linkages between the CDVs, the CCGF 
and the provincial network. Creating vertical linkages between 
these platforms, as SVBC has recently started to do, is an 
important strategy. It will enable CDVs, for example, to articulate 
their concerns at higher governance levels, and will also allow 
provincial network members to learn about forest governance 
issues requiring attention at the provincial level. At present, verti-
cal linkages are weak or non-existent. The provincial workshop 
revealed that CSOs in Mbandaka are unaware of the day-to-day 
governance issues faced by local communities. It also revealed 
potentially conflicting interests between the CDVs who want to 
halt charcoal production and CSOs in Mbandaka whose con-
stituencies need charcoal to cook. 
 Dialogue for forest governance and accountability at each 
level. Each platform can collectively analyse forest governance 
issues and identify mutually acceptable solutions. Dialogue 
entails not only exchanging different viewpoints and stakes, but 
also jointly designing informal rules and regulations, including 
accountability relations, binding on all stakeholders. With a great 
deal of support from IUCN, the CCGF has engaged in this dia-
logue and succeeded in obtaining some of the rents paid by ITB. 
These processes still require substantial support from IUCN.
Bottlenecks in internal performance
Various internal issues hamper the realisation of each platform’s 
objectives, as well as the effectiveness of SVBC’s intervention strat-
egies. The following need careful consideration.
 The representativeness of the CDVs, the CCGF and the provin-
cial network. This concerns the capacity of the CDV to talk on 
behalf of an entire community with the public and private sec-
tors, the capacity of CCGF members to represent the interests 
of their organisations, as well as the capacity of CSOs working 
at the provincial level to represent the interests of their members 
at the territorial or community level. Up to a third of the 32 CDVs 
reportedly do not meet with all local stakeholders. Some CDVs 
deliberately represent only some clans to the detriment of oth-
ers, and do not always take into account the interests of groups 
such as women and pygmies. At the CCGF level the capacity of 
special interest groups such as women and pygmies to defend 
their interests in forest governance is weak.³ The first meeting of 
the provincial network also showed that its CSO members are 
not (yet) able to talk as representatives of their organisations, 
and that provincial CSOs are unaware of day-to-day local forest 
governance issues. 
 The public sector also has limited capacity to fulfil its responsibili-
ties and duties.
 All structures need IUCN’s support to obtain objective informa-
tion about forest rules and regulations. This information, and the 
correct interpretation of existing rules and regulations, depend 
on informants from Kinshasa. The workshops clearly revealed 
that many organisations and stakeholders have differing informa-
tion on forest governance issues, and that either this information 
is not being confirmed by written statements, or that written 
information is being interpreted differently.
 IUCN’s moral support is still needed by CDVs who want to de-
nounce undesirable practices. It was also needed to direct part 
of the loading beach rents collected by the territory towards the 
environmental radio station.
 The day-to-day management of the CCGF requires IUCN’s 
support to mobilise the executive committee to work towards its 
strategic priorities.
 A dependence on meeting allowances for the CDVs, the CCGF’s 
General Assembly and the provincial network. There are clear 
indications that the allowances paid by IUCN for weekly CDV 
meetings are contributing to the exclusion of some members in 
favour of family or clan members.
Important cultural or local conventions that could undermine the 
performance of the platforms are the incentives for cooperation and 
the difficulty of disseminating information.
 The incentives to work together in a multi-stakeholder process 
are weaker than the incentives for uncooperative behaviour that 
¹ Though ITB failed to obtain a new concession title after the 2008 review (see 
discussion above). 
² The workshops held in Bikoro and Mbandaka clearly showed that people are 
unable to relate any of the forest governance issues they face daily to the provi-
sions of the forest law. The law has been disseminated by the World Resources 
Institute (WRI) but only some CSOs are aware of its contents.
³ Interview with representatives of pygmy and women’s organisations at the 
territorial level.
8privileges one’s own family or clan (roadblocks, demonstra-
tions, corruption). Collaboration among CSOs is also rare or 
non-existent. Equator province’s network of NGOs broke up 
after conflicts over issues such as representation in the Sun City 
peace process. Also the relations between the provincial and 
territorial platforms set up by the World Resources Institute (WRI) 
to combat corruption are weak.
 Disseminating information in DRC is a major obstacle. Despite 
many IEC interventions at all levels on the forest law and related 
rules and regulations, the study informants and workshop par-
ticipants uniformly emphasised the need to further disseminate 
the do’s and don’ts of forest laws. This dissemination failure can 
be explained by a local tradition of keeping information to oneself 
for personal advantage.¹ This undermines every IEC activity by 
preventing information from trickling down. A second tradition is 
that people expect allowances for attending meetings. Conven-
ing local meetings without allowances then becomes difficult. 
One way of improving information dissemination may be to make 
traditional leaders responsible for organising meetings.² Another 
may be to link directly the information disseminated to day-to-
day issues faced by local people.³
Conclusions 
Both DRC’s 2002 forest law and the political decentralisation policy 
launched in 2006 have yet to be fully implemented. All royalties and 
taxes are still being channelled to the Treasury, rather than 40% of 
revenues staying with the provinces for local spending.
The rules and regulations already in place do not yet provide 
a framework for addressing local forest governance issues. Clear 
guidelines on the social contract are lacking, in particular an imple-
menting decree on the rights and obligations of the parties to the 
contract. In the absence of any guidance, timber companies are 
negotiating social contracts directly with local populations, with-
out government intervening to ensure they are fair and legal. Also 
lacking are rules and regulations to control the charcoal trade and 
artisanal logging, as requested by the CDVs who represent the 
interests of local communities.
All four of the timber companies operating in Bikoro obtained 
their concession titles after the moratorium of 2002, and the 2008 
national commission on concessions legalised the title of only one 
of these companies. None of the other companies had their titles 
reconfirmed, including the two companies who had participated in 
SVBC up to that point. Of these two, IUCN ceased working with 
Leyda after the 2008 decision, but has continued working with ITB 
because the company has special permission from the Environment 
Ministry to continue its operations. The issue here is to what extent 
IUCN took the 2002 moratorium into account when SVBC began 
in 2005.
A second issue is the positioning of the CDV, the CCGF and the 
provincial platform with respect to decentralisation. As the locus of 
decentralised rural government under the 2006 Constitution, the 
sector will play an important role in forest governance, especially in 
the monitoring of the social contract and in providing social infra-
structure. The province will remain the key actor in land registration, 
coordination of forest policies, drafting implementing decrees and 
forest classification. The territory will probably become a decon-
centrated entity that will only implement provincial or national rules 
and regulations without having any decision-making power. This 
implies that the CCGF will have to explore ways of establishing a 
multi-stakeholder dialogue on governance at the sector level after 
local elections.
SVBC’s intervention strategy, i.e. setting up multi-stakeholder 
platforms at different levels to engage in managing conflict, dis-
seminating information, creating vertical linkages and supporting 
dialogue for joint action, seems relevant and promising in a context 
where the existing rules and regulations provide only a weak frame-
work for tackling forest governance. The platforms will contribute to 
locally defined rules, regulations and practices.
Positive results can already be seen in the fields of conflict 
management and information dissemination, whereas the creation 
of vertical linkages and multi-stakeholder dialogue have only just 
begun. If the project structures are to achieve their objectives, their 
organisational performance must be strengthened and vertical link-
ages created between each structure. The main issues to address 
are increasing each structure’s capacity to represent its members 
effectively, strengthening the performance of member organisations, 
providing objective information on forest policies, rules and regula-
tions, and reducing dependence on IUCN.
Two of the challenges facing IUCN are that the incentives to 
cooperate are weaker than those to pursue family or clan interests, 
and that serious institutional weaknesses hamper the dissemination 
of information.
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¹ Sources: Chair, Executive Committee, CCGF; IUCN; Digital Congo TV. 
² IUCN is currently experimenting with this. 
³ Based on the workshops with the CCGF and provincial network.
93 Defining forest governance
This chapter explores forest governance in Equator province, in 
particular how it is defined by SVBC’s stakeholders. It is based on 
ideas and responses obtained from workshops and interviews. This 
information has been compiled and clustered by WI, but the cluster-
ing has yet to be communicated to all stakeholders.
On some occasions during the study, the research question was 
formulated as: What has been the most significant change in forest 
governance in the preceding period? This allowed the author to 
explore IUCN’s contribution to forest governance (see discussion of 
CDV workshop below). On other occasions, the question was put 
as: What does good forest governance mean to you? or govern-
ance principles were inferred from group work on the governance of 
forest uses such as charcoal production and artisanal logging.
The next three sections respectively explore governance 
concepts and policy principles; discuss how stakeholders define 
forest governance; and briefly assesses these findings against the 
conceptual background and activities of SVBC.
Good forest governance
Exploring concepts and principles
There are many definitions of governance – and forest governance – 
and many researchers, policy makers and practitioners working on 
this concept (Bodegom, Klaver, Schoubroeck & Valk 2008). Many 
are value-laden, reflecting the norms and judgements of stakehold-
ers in specific cultural settings.
Bavinck, Chuenpagdee, Diallo, Heijden, Kooiman, Mahon & Wil-
liams (2005) explore governance in the context of fisheries manage-
ment, proposing the following definition:
Governance is the whole of public as well as private interactions that are 
initiated to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities. 
It includes the formulation and application of principles guiding those 
interactions and care for institutions that enable them.
This definition emphasizes the altered role of the state, the 
private sector and civil society in governance. Rather than govern-
ments being in the driving seat, new governance thinking recog-
nises the importance of co-steering with civil society and business. 
Important aspects of this new governance concept include (Bavinck 
et al. 2005; Kuindersma, Boonstra, Boer, Gerritsen, Pleijte & Selnes 
2006; Bodegom et al. 2008):
 A recognition and growing consensus that governance is a 
multi-stakeholder responsibility and process, operating at differ-
ent policy and administrative levels, and embracing stakeholder 
diversity in interests, perceptions and ambitions.
 A recognition that solutions and means are needed to cope with 
uncertainty and complexity. In process terms, this means that 
societal change through “learning to adapt” plays an important 
role in improving governance.
 An acknowledgement of the importance of day-to-day man-
agement of strategic issues in society, but also an emphasis 
on creating and maintaining the institutions or arrangements 
needed for this management. The new governance concept also 
explicitly addresses the norms, values and principles shaping 
those institutions. So any assessment of governance would look 
at the effectiveness of solutions, the legitimacy of the institutions 
established to manage society, and the moral principles guiding 
the acceptability or unacceptability of those institutions. A fourth 
criterion of assessment would look at the coherence between 
these three “orders”.
Influential political and development organisations have identi-
fied various principles of governance, many rooted in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. These include:
 Voice and accountability (WB), including stakeholder participa-
tion (UNDP).
 Political stability and absence of violence (WB).
 Government effectiveness (WB). This measures the competence 
of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery. It 
also covers efficiency, i.e. the extent to which limited human, 
financial and natural resources are allocated without unneces-
sary waste, delay or corruption (UNDP).
 Regulatory quality (WB). This refers to the incidence of market-
unfriendly policies.
 Rule of law (WB). This refers to the quality of contract enforce-
ment, the performance of the police and courts (including the 
independence of the judiciary), and the incidence of crime. 
It also covers fairness (the degree to which rules are applied 
equally in society) and decency (the degree to which the 
formulation and stewardship of those rules avoid humiliating or 
harming people) (UNDP).
 Control of corruption (WB). 
 Transparency, i.e. the degree of clarity and openness in decision 
making (UNDP).
 Policy coherence (EU).
Though generally accepted by many countries and groups, 
these principles are ambitious and sometimes contested in different 
cultural settings. Grindle (2004) criticises the “good governance” 
agenda as unrealistic, overly demanding and lacking in guidance 
on setting priorities. She suggests an alternative “good-enough” 
governance agenda which treats governance as a learning process 
sensitive to existing capabilities and contexts.
Recognising that cultural values in developing countries often 
differ from those in Western or developed countries, Jabeen (2007) 
argues that governance should be “indiginalised” and embedded in 
its cultural context.
Based on these observations, Bodegom & Klaver (2007) asked 
the Central African Forest Commission’s (COMIFAC) task force on 
AFLEG–FLEGT to formulate its own principles of good governance 
(see Box 2). Comparing these with the principles of WB and UNDP 
reveals many similarities. The differences include the decentralisa-
tion of forest management and respect for the rights and tradi-
tions of local and indigenous people as particular aspects of forest 
governance in Central Africa. The principle of regulatory quality iden-
tified by the WB is absent.
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Consequences for the study
In line with the foregoing discussion, the study of forest governance 
in Bikoro territory and Equator province aimed to define a “good 
enough” governance agenda based on local norms and values. 
Rather than introducing governance principles found in the litera-
ture, stakeholders were asked for their own ideas about govern-
ance. Where possible the author tried to obtain detailed information 
about the three elements or “orders” of governance elaborated 
above. For example, the provincial workshop started with the 
question, What forest management principles are necessary for 
improved forest governance?
Good forest governance in Equator province 
This section presents the forest governance issues identified by 
local communities in the CDV workshop, and by stakeholders at the 
territorial and provincial levels. The author has clustered the findings 
into the following common themes: 
 Being able to denounce harmful practices to responsive public 
authorities. This is particularly relevant to the production and 
trade of charcoal. It was also identified as an important principle 
in the monitoring of timber companies.
 Equity in sharing forest revenues and resources with local popu-
lations. This is about respecting the forest-dependent livelihoods 
of local people, by promoting alternative livelihoods, sharing the 
income generated by timber companies equally, using taxes rev-
enues to reduce poverty, classifying forests (which can have an 
impact on access to forest resources), and ensuring forest con-
cession tender procedures do not favour large timber companies 
over smaller organisations such as community associations.
 Being able to manage conflicts locally through mediation, with-
out any intervention by the provincial court. This is particularly 
important for managing conflicts over the social contract and 
land disputes between clans.
 Civil society participation in decision making was often men-
tioned but not elaborated in detail. Some stakeholders want a 
say in the award of concession rights; others also want a say in 
which species can be commercially exploited.
 Acceptance of the forest law as a binding set of rules. The legiti-
macy of the law has been questioned by both public authorities 
and civil society. Forest governance will be constrained if these 
stakeholders refuse to recognise the law. On the other hand, 
space is needed to amend certain articles of the law.
 A regulatory framework that guides forest exploitation. The 
existing rules and regulations, i.e. the forest law and implement-
ing decrees, do not yet provide the necessary framework for 
improving forest governance. Examples are the lack of regulation 
of social contract negotiations and charcoal production.
 Adequate law enforcement. The rules and regulations for 
classifying forests, checking licenses and collecting taxes are 
currently unenforced. The main reasons are that the forest 
departments at territorial and provincial levels are not yet opera-
tional, and that the police at the sector level are unaware of their 
role in forest law enforcement. The rent-seeking behaviour and 
poor task performance of civil servants was openly discussed in 
every workshop.
 Transparency in tax collection and expenditure. Various non-
existent taxes are collected; tax payments are negotiated; 
and not all tax revenues flow to authorities at the territorial or 
provincial level.
 Decentralisation of tax collection and expenditure from the cen-
tre. The royalties and other taxes currently paid by timber com-
panies to the Treasury are not being transferred to the province 
or lower administrative levels.
 Information, education and communication.
Forest governance issues at the community level. 
Participants in the workshop for CDVs emphasised the ability to 
denounce harmful forest exploitation practices, fairness in sharing 
forest revenues and local conflict management as important govern-
ance issues.
The CDVs clearly intend to denounce illegal practices, but the 
CCGF charter (which defines their role) does not mention denun-
ciation as an objective.¹ The CDVs also want IUCN to play a role in 
supporting any denunciations, but at the same time recognise that 
IUCN in Kinshasa is too far away to provide the necessary support. 
The CDVs fear the possible negative repercussions of denouncing 
undesirable practices. The charcoal production and trade system, 
for example, is run by powerful elites such as the territorial police 
officer and a timber company agent.² The key question here is 
what source of authority the CDVs can rely on when denouncing 
illegal practices.
A related issue is that stakeholders need to know what forest 
exploitation practices are considered illegal.³ In the case of charcoal 
production and trade, the relevant rules and regulations are lacking. 
The only entry points for regulation are to discuss the issue in the 
platforms, and to jointly establish informal rules and regulations for 
controlling such practices.
The responsiveness and responsibility of local authorities and 
their commitment to ending harmful practices must also be consid-
ered. Denouncing undesirable or illegal actions makes little sense if 
public officials take no corresponding action.4
Box 2  Forest governance according to the AFLEG–FLEGT task force  
of COMIFAC
 Being accountable at all levels
 Transparency and legitimacy towards one’s constituencies
 Equity and equitable sharing of forest revenues and costs
 Respect for all stakeholders and promotion of the public interest
 Justice, sanctions and fighting corruption
 Information, education and communication
 Decentralisation of forest management and decision making
 Respect for the rights and traditions of local and indigenous people
 Law enforcement and other rules and regulations, improving forest monitoring 
and control systems
Source: Bodegom & Klaver (2007)
¹ According to their charter the CDVs play an important role in IEC activities, 
collecting forest exploitation data and mediation. But information provided by 
IUCN describes the different objectives listed in Chapter 2. 
² Sources: Territorial administrator, CCGF, CDV Moheli. 
³ Sources: Provincial workshop, CCGF workshop, Kinshasa-based forest law 
expert. 
4 A representative of the local anti-corruption committees set up by WRI in 
2005 reported that four police officers arrested by the territorial authorities on 
charges of corruption and sexual harassment were released after the province 
intervened. The anti-corruption committees have proved to be effective in 
reducing the number of arbitrary arrests, reducing the number of illegal taxes 
collected, resolving land disputes at the local level, and reducing corruption in 
schools.
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The CDVs¹ want a fair share of forest revenues and resources 
through the promotion of rational forest use and through the 
social contracts negotiated with timber companies. They report 
a positive trend over the past 18 months in the rational use of 
forest resources by artisanal loggers,² but – owing to new loading 
facilities and increased timber transport by water – a harmful trend 
of increasing charcoal production for consumers in Kinshasa. No 
information is available on the rational use of forest resources by 
timber companies.
The most important significant change in forest management is 
the increased capacity of CDVs to manage conflicts locally. Being 
able to manage one’s own conflicts, rather than having to rely on 
the courts, is seen as an important step towards improved govern-
ance. The country’s juridical system is still ineffective and costly, and 
“a prevailing culture of impunity” seriously threatens respect for hu-
man rights (United Nations 2007). The CDVs and the CCGF report 
that the number of conflicts taken to court has declined consider-
ably as a result of the awareness raising and information sessions 
organised by IUCN.
Forest governance principles at the territorial level
Besides the governance issues identified at the local level and vali-
dated in the CCGF workshop, other issues identified at the territorial 
level included regulatory gaps, law enforcement and transparency in 
tax collection and disbursement.
A legal framework is missing that would 1) regulate charcoal pro-
duction and trade; 2) reduce the confusion over the official status 
of artisanal loggers; and 3) clarify the negotiation of social contracts 
while stakeholders await an official implementing decree. Some 
of these rules and regulations must be prepared at the national 
level (such as the implementing decree on the social contract and 
charcoal production and trade), and some at the provincial level 
(artisanal logging). Until now, however, Equator province has made 
no effort to establish the institutions, rules or regulations needed to 
improve forest governance.
As with the social contract, which is being negotiated in the 
absence of a implementing decree, the CDVs, CCGF and provincial 
network could make an effort to develop their own rules and regula-
tions for artisanal logging and charcoal production and trade. This 
approach was discussed at the CCGF workshop, but participants 
concluded that the energy supply problem in Kinshasa had to be 
solved before charcoal production in Bikoro territory could be re-
duced, and moreover that powerful elites were controlling the sup-
ply chain. To what extent could locally defined rules and regulations 
regulate undesirable charcoal production and trade while these 
external factors went unresolved?
Many issues related to law enforcement were raised at the ter-
ritorial workshop. These included forest classification (the responsi-
bility of provincial authorities), the review of concession titles (carried 
out in Kinshasa), the supervision of the social contract and control 
of timber company licences (territorial level), and collection of legal 
taxes that are paid into the public treasury, especially at the level of 
the territory.³
Law enforcement requires a public sector with the necessary 
human and financial resources, and public officials who are aware 
of their duties and rights regarding forest law enforcement.4 It also 
calls for a human resource management system that rewards good 
performance (results-based) by public servants and sanctions poor 
performance. Discussions in the CCGF and provincial workshops 
revealed the weak capacity and incentives of the public sector for 
playing their role in forest governance.
In response, the CDVs proposed that they engage in monitor-
ing the implementation of forest concession management plans. 
One of the timber companies contested this suggestion after 
the workshop, claiming that local communities are incapable of 
monitoring the technical aspects of forest concession management. 
The author, however, identifies this as a possible issue for IUCN to 
consider, given that no one is monitoring the timber companies. Civil 
society and the public sector could join forces in this task.
The sub-group working on artisanal logging revealed that tax 
collection and expenditure are not transparent.5 Public officials do 
not respect existing rules and regulations for collecting taxes or 
sanctioning violators. A concrete example given was that many tax 
payers are not given a receipt. Participants in the CCGF workshop 
suggested that all consumers or buyers of timber should first ask 
the producer to show official receipts of taxes paid.
Forest governance principles at the provincial level
At this level, the most important principles discussed were the 
equity principle and the need for increased transparency in tax col-
lection and expenditure.
The equity principle was expressed in two different ways. First, 
civil society participants claimed that the social contract does not 
provide enough benefits for the local population. Second, they 
asked for a review of Article 83 of the forest law, which states that 
forest concessions are to be allocated by tender. This limits the 
opportunities for local communities to obtain concessions because 
they lack the means to compete with the larger timber companies.
With regard to tax collection and use, it became clear that timber 
companies must constantly show their licenses and permits to 
public officials from the province, territory and sector, even though 
this information is available from the territorial administration. It also 
became clear that the responsibilities of forest officials and the po-
lice at different administrative levels are poorly defined. Also, police 
are issuing fines for arbitrary offences without the necessary formal 
authority. A clear division of responsibilities in law enforcement and 
control is missing.6
Public officials were asked to improve their performance in 
collecting taxes and overseeing licenses. The timber companies 
also suggested that they keep records of the taxes they pay and 
compare these with the amounts declared by officials.
Forest governance principles important at all levels
All levels emphasised acceptance of the forest law as a binding set 
of rules and regulations, the need for civil society participation in 
decision making, and decentralisation of forest tax collection and 
expenditure from Kinshasa to the provinces. Also important are IEC 
activities addressing stakeholders at every level.
The idea of the forest law as a binding set of rules is not yet fully 
accepted. In the CCGF workshop, both the forest engineer and the 
territorial administrator of Bikoro questioned the status of the forest 
law. They argued that the law has not yet been officially approved, 
¹ Sources: CDV and CCGF workshops, field observations. 
² Artisanal loggers are being encouraged to process trees immediately after 
felling them, rather than felling many trees at the same time and leaving them in 
the forest. This is to protect trees that host edible caterpillars. 
³ Before the 2008 Law on Decentralisation, provinces were entitled to collect 
only taxes on artisanal logging. The territory collects taxes on industrial logging.
4 Source: CCGF workshop. 
5 Sources: Artisanal logger, CCGF workshop. 
6 Sources: Provincial workshop, CDV Moheli, Kinshasa-based forest law expert.
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and that it will take effect only when all implementing decrees have 
been issued.
Civil society participants in the provincial workshop also ques-
tioned the provisions of the forest law, in particular those on the 
ownership of land and forest resources. Although the law clearly 
states that all forests belong to the State, civil society groups claim 
that they belong both to the government and to those who are 
being governed. In other words, local populations are entitled to a 
larger share of forest resources and benefits.
As mentioned above, civil society groups at the provincial level 
also disagree with Article 83 of the forest law concerning the alloca-
tion of concessions by tender. 
Civil society participation in classifying forests and allocating con-
cession rights was mentioned as an important governance issue. 
Such participation is absent from the forest law, which foresees only 
the establishment of a provincial advisory committee with public and 
private sector representatives. To what extent this committee will 
consult with local communities remains unclear.
Timber companies pay their royalties directly to the national 
Treasury, in violation of the constitutional requirement that taxes 
and royalties are collected by local governments (which retain 
15%), transferred to the province (which retains a further 25%), and 
submitted to the national Treasury (the remaining 60%). Currently 
every administrative level is claiming its share, but the Treasury has 
yet to disburse any revenues. It is expected that this problem will 
be partly solved by a recent law granting legal status and transfer-
ring certain responsibilities to the province. The collection of taxes 
at the local government (sector) level will not start until those bodies 
are operational.
Current tax collecting procedures mean that provinces have no 
financial or human resources to intervene in the forest sector. They 
can only impose taxes on artisanal loggers, who are not properly 
registered as yet.
Information, education and communication. Despite many efforts 
to disseminate the forest law, it is clear that its provisions are either 
unknown or ignored by forest governance stakeholders. Familiarity 
with the forest law alone is insufficient, however. Joint discussion of 
forest governance issues is also still needed to identify and agree on 
the way forward, including roles and responsibilities. The environ-
mental radio station will become an important and valuable tool for 
strengthening IEC actions.
The way forward 
Reflections on forest governance in Equator province
Improving forest governance in Equator province requires inter-
ventions by many different stakeholders. Collaborative efforts are 
needed vertically within the administrative hierarchy and between 
CSOs operating at those levels, and horizontally between different 
stakeholders. These findings align with the conceptualisation by 
Bavinck et al. (2005) of the principles of governance as complex-
ity, multi-stakeholder involvement, social learning, and a holistic or 
systems approach.
If we treat forest governance as a system, several external issues 
must be considered. These include a decentralisation process that 
still hampers the transfer of forest royalties to the province and the 
future local governments, an incomplete regulatory framework, the 
lack of involvement of the public health and education sectors in the 
social contract, and the energy crisis in Kinshasa. A lack of respect 
for human rights is also undermining the system.
Within the system we observe that the justice sector in Bikoro 
plays a negligible or even harmful role in governance. Local popula-
tions and the CDVs prefer to manage their own conflicts. Public 
sector performance is also poor. Some public officials question 
the legitimacy of the forest law; existing rules and regulations do 
not provide enough guidance to prevent harmful forest practices; 
law enforcement is weak; and tax collection and expenditure lack 
transparency.
Civil society performance at the territorial and provincial levels is 
weak. The provincial network of NGOs fell apart after its members 
quarrelled over internal leadership and their representation in the 
Sun City peace process.¹ CSOs working in Mbandaka are unaware 
¹ Put bluntly, the main point of contention was the division of the allowances paid 
to the CSO representative in the Sun City peace process.
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of forest governance issues in Bikoro because there is no exchange 
of information between the territory and the province.
The weak performance of CSOs and the public sector hampers 
monitoring of forest concession management and allows elites to 
capture forest rents from charcoal trading and artisanal logging.
Based on the governance concept developed by Bavinck et al. 
(2005), several conclusions can be drawn about forest governance 
in Bikoro:
 Forest governance effectiveness. The most important issues 
to be addressed concern the sustainable exploitation of forest 
resources, in particular the control of charcoal production and 
trade, artisanal logging, and forest exploitation by companies 
who entered the territory after the 2002 moratorium. The public 
sector is ineffective in monitoring and controlling these stake-
holders. Law enforcement is weak or absent.
 Forest governance and the legitimacy of existing institu-
tions, rules and regulations. The forest law’s status as a 
binding set of rules is questioned by both the public sector and 
civil society, and rules and regulations for rational forest use 
are still lacking. Even the credibility of public servants and their 
administrations is under question because the provincial forest 
administration and its territorial arms lack human and financial 
resources, as well as the political will to intervene. The provincial 
forest administration also lacks power and legitimacy because 
it is not yet fully operational as a decentralised entity. Lastly the 
legitimacy of the justice sector is under question because it 
fails to provide basic guarantees of the human rights of forest 
governance stakeholders. In the absence of official rules and 
regulations, the various platforms are currently designing their 
own institutional arrangements. These include arrangements for 
negotiating social contracts, denouncing harmful forest prac-
tices, monitoring forest exploitation and increasing the transpar-
ency of tax collection and expenditure.
 Normative issues in forest governance. Civil society in 
particular is trying to promote broader participation in decision 
making and greater equity in the sharing of forest resources and 
benefits. Civil society is also questioning the ownership of forests 
and forest land. Do these belong to local communities or to the 
State? These efforts have yet to result in better outcomes for 
local populations.
Strengthening forest governance through SVBC
SVBC recognises that improving forest governance demands in-
terventions at many levels and from many stakeholders. Its support 
to platforms at local, territorial and provincial levels is a promising 
strategy which is already contributing to the following goals:
 Managing conflict at the local level. This has been identified as 
the most important significant change attributable to the project.
 IEC activities on forest laws and related implementing de-
crees, and citizens’ rights and obligations. These continue to 
be needed because of the communication failures and cultural 
obstacles already noted. SVBC has contributed greatly to im-
proving forest governance in terms of providing information, but 
much remains to be done and not all of it can be achieved by 
IUCN alone.
 Transparency in tax collection and expenditure. With consider-
able support from IUCN, some of the rents collected by Bikoro 
territory have been earmarked for constructing an environmental 
radio station.
IUCN could increase the added value of its forest governance 
interventions by reinforcing efforts to develop institutions, rules and 
regulations. These include agreeing on denouncing harmful forest 
practices and appropriate sanctioning mechanisms, improving the 
terms of the social contract for local populations, agreeing on the 
monitoring of exploitation by timber companies, and increasing the 
transparency of tax collection and expenditure.
Conclusions
This chapter has explored how SVBC’s stakeholders define good 
forest governance, and how the structures put in place by IUCN 
can contribute to the principles of good governance.
Table 3 summarises the forest governance issues identified by 
stakeholders at each administrative level.
When discussing these issues with stakeholders, it became clear 
that SVBC is operating in a difficult context, and that improving for-
est governance demands a holistic, process-oriented approach that 
engages all stakeholders in shared learning. External factors beyond 
the influence of the project’s platforms include decentralisation, the 
gaps in the regulatory framework, the exclusion of the public health 
and education sectors from the social contract, the energy crisis in 
Kinshasa, and a failing justice sector.
It also became clear that both public sector and civil society 
performance in forest governance has been weak, giving timber 
companies and other stakeholders a free hand to exploit forest 
resources as they wish.
SVBC’s intervention strategy, which organises stakeholders 
both horizontally and vertically, is making a valuable contribution 
to improving forest governance. The major achievements so far in-
clude the success of CDVs in managing local conflicts, the project’s 
moderate contribution to IEC activities (moderate because informa-
tion is not trickling down despite the efforts of many stakeholders), 
and an initial contribution to increased transparency in tax collection 
and expenditure.
Future efforts to improve forest governance should address 
issues of legitimacy and the elaboration of a regulatory framework 
which will ensure rational forest use. In line with the shared learn-
ing processes required for better forest governance, a dialogue 
between all stakeholders is needed to set further priorities for a 
“good-enough” governance action agenda.
Table 3 Stakeholder concerns in forest governance, Equator province
Platform Issue
Local   Being able to denounce harmful practices to responsive public 
authorities
  Equity in sharing forest revenues and resources among the 
local population
  Conflicts managed locally without intervention by the provincial 
court
Territorial The above issues, plus
  A coherent regulatory framework that guides stakeholder 
interventions in the forest sector
  Adequate law enforcement
  Transparency in tax collection and expenditure
Provincial   Equity in sharing forest revenues and resources by the local 
population
  Transparency in tax collection and expenditure
All levels   Civil society participation in decision making
  Acceptance of the forest law as a binding set of rules
  Decentralisation of tax collection and expenditure
  Information, education and communication (IEC)
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4  Social accountability for 
improved forest governance
This chapter discusses answers to the question of what type of 
accountability arrangements are needed for improved forest govern-
ance. Starting with a short account of relevant literature, it identifies 
three accountability relations, including social accountability, which 
represents the relation between civil society and the public sector. 
It then briefly assesses existing social accountability relations in 
Equator province, identifying three entry points for designing rela-
tions within SVBC. Lastly it assesses the factors to be considered in 
designing accountability relations around these entry points, and the 
relevance of the criteria identified in the literature.
Accountability and social accountability
Definitions
Lawson & Rakner (2005) define accountability as follows:
Accountability denotes a relationship between a bearer of a right or a 
legitimate claim and the agents or agencies responsible for fulfilling or 
respecting that right. The most basic accountability relationship is that 
between a person or agency entrusted with a particular task or certain 
powers or resources, on the one hand, and the ‘principal’ on whose 
behalf the task is undertaken, on the other. Accountability, simply put, is 
a two-way relationship of power. It denotes the duty to be accountable in 
return for the delegation of a task, a power or a resource.
Accountability includes three central elements that shape the 
relations between stakeholders in society (Mulgan 2000, cited by 
Ackerman 2005):
 Accountability is external: the account is given to some other 
person or body outside the person or body being held ac-
countable. This external accountability should not be confused 
with the internal accountability systems often used in organisa-
tions – it is about relations between organisations. Examples 
of external accountability include the relations between gov-
ernments and citizens, political parties and voters, boards of 
corporations and shareholders, and service providers and their 
clients or users. Examples of internal accountability include 
the relations between operational staff and supervisors, and 
between a CSO’s administration and its members. In practice, 
it is difficult to make a clear distinction between external and 
internal accountability.
 It involves social interaction and exchange, in that the side calling 
for the account seeks answers and rectification, whereas the 
side being held accountable responds and accepts sanctions.
 It implies rights of authority, in that those calling for an account 
are asserting rights of “superior authority” over those who are 
accountable, including the rights to demand answers and to 
impose sanctions.
Ackerman (2005) identifies four main strategies to strengthen 
accountability, of which social accountability is the most recent: 1) 
Weberian reform (institutionalisation of rationality within the public 
sector); 2) Marketisation (of public services and introduction of New 
Public Management (NPM) strategies); 3) Independent agencies 
(such as ombudsmen, corruption control agencies, legislative 
investigative commissions and administrative courts); and 4) Social 
accountability. The last relies on civic engagement, in which ordinary 
citizens or CSOs, or both, participate directly or indirectly in improv-
ing accountability (Malena, Forster & Singh 2004).
Initiatives such as participatory budgeting, administrative 
reforms, social audits, citizen report cards and community score 
cards all involve citizens in the oversight of government and can be 
considered social accountability initiatives.
Ackerman (2005) distinguishes three types of accountability rela-
tions (see Figure 1):
 The vertical relations linking citizens to their representatives 
through elections.
 The horizontal relations and mechanisms requiring public officials 
and agencies to report not only directly to their superiors, but 
also horizontally to other officials and agencies within govern-
ment itself.
 The social accountability relations between the public sector and 
citizens and civil society.
The design of social accountability mechanisms
Rationale
In recent years social accountability has gained increasing attention 
as a development strategy. Effective social accountability arrange-
ments are believed to improve governance and reduce poverty in 
several ways:
 Improved (social) accountability makes a fundamental con-
tribution to developing capacity and may supply a promising 
Figure 1 Accountability relations. After Ackerman (2005).
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alternative to more conventional training or organisational 
strengthening approaches (Theisohn 2007).
 Democracy will become stronger, services more efficient, cor-
ruption will be exposed and the poorest in society will be better 
served by public service providers. Good governance practice 
will be recognised and so respected (World Bank 2004).
 Improved stakeholder voice and accountability contribute to 
poverty reduction as well as other (indirect) outcomes such as 
greater ownership of development programmes and pro-poor 
policies (O’Neill, Foresti & Hudson 2007).
 Civic engagement and appropriate accountability arrangements 
are seen as the solution to the double crisis of state and market 
failure in the developing world. Market failure can be corrected 
through proactive consumers and state failure can be remedied 
through the action of an informed citizenry which knows its rights 
and requires government to uphold them (Ackerman 2005).
Issues to take into account when designing social 
accountability relations
Ackerman (2005) lists six criteria to be considered when designing 
an accountability relation:
 Incentive structure for good behaviour – punishment or reward-
based. This refers to the previously mentioned right or “superior 
authority” of citizens and civil society to sanction or reward 
public sector performance.
 Accountability for what – following rules or performance. Do you 
ask public servants to respect the rules and regulations in place, 
or to work towards certain results?
 Level of institutionalisation – ranging from independent external 
initiatives to ones where governments institutionalise participa-
tion by external stakeholders.
 Depth of involvement. This concerns the level of participation 
and influence enjoyed by civil society. It has much to do with 
the position of civil society organisations in relation to the public 
sector. The author distinguishes three main positions that civil 
society can take in relation to the public sector.¹ First, civil soci-
ety can play the role of a watchdog and evaluate public sector 
performance in forest governance from the outside. Second, civil 
society can engage in a dialogue with the public sector to iden-
tify and jointly implement strategies for improving governance. 
Third, civil society can try to influence the public sector’s forest 
governance agenda by means of advocacy and lobbying.
 Inclusiveness of participation – ranging from including only the 
“well-behaved” groups to consulting extensively with a range of 
stakeholders, including marginalised groups.
 Branches of government – will the social accountability relation 
be established between civil society and the executive, legislative 
or judicial branch of government?
Lawson & Rakner (2005) also identify transparency, “answerabil-
ity” and controllability as three key criteria for effective accountability 
relations:
 Transparency means that decisions are taken and business 
conducted openly, and that sufficient information is available for 
agencies and the public to assess whether the relevant proce-
dures are being followed, consonant with the given mandate.
 “Answerability” refers to the obligation of decision makers to jus-
tify their decisions publicly; to prove they are reasonable, rational 
and acting within their mandate. It is also about the degree of re-
sponsiveness of decision makers to questions from civil society.
 Controllability refers to mechanisms to sanction actions and de-
cisions that run counter to the given mandates and procedures 
(checks and balances).
Comparing these criteria with those given by Ackerman sug-
gests that transparency and “answerability” are two key criteria to 
add to the six listed above. Controllability is related to the incentive 
structure for good behaviour and refers in particular to the possibili-
ties and power sources within civil society for sanctioning inappro-
priate public sector performance or rewarding good performance.
Malena et al. (2004) propose a stepwise approach to creating 
social accountability mechanisms. The first step is to identify entry 
points for social accountability, followed by a phase of building 
an information or evidence base. In the next step, information is 
brought into the public sphere to stimulate a public debate. Lastly 
this information is disseminated to a wider audience and changes 
are negotiated. This approach, however, does not take into account 
the efforts needed to mobilise support from all stakeholders.
This list of criteria and the process of creating social accountabil-
ity relations provide some guidance for analysing existing account-
ability relations generally in Equator province, as well as the quality 
of the social accountability relations promoted by SVBC.
Implications for the study methodology
The issue under consideration is the accountability arrangements 
needed for improved forest governance. Following the approach 
of Malena et al. (2004), the first step in this study was to find ap-
propriate entry points for designing social accountability relations. 
However, the many forest governance challenges identified (see 
previous chapter) made it difficult to draw up an exhaustive list of 
possible entry points. The workshop discussions and interviews 
with informants focused mainly on identifying forest governance 
issues with implications for accountability arrangements. In practice, 
accountability was not always put on the agenda of the workshops. 
It was discussed explicitly only twice: once in the CCGF workshop, 
where a sub-group of CDVs explored how easy or how difficult it 
is to denounce harmful forest practices; and once in the provincial 
workshop, where sub-groups reflected on how to improve public 
accountability.² Clearly more workshop time is needed to analyse 
accountability arrangements and to assess their potential contribu-
tion to improved forest governance.
The following paragraphs analyse the different accountability 
relations that were identified, and identifies the next steps for IUCN 
in enhancing social accountability relations.
Accountability relations in Equator province
Figure 2 maps the different accountability relations found in Equator 
Province. The underlying assumption is that vertical, horizontal and 
¹ This classification is the result of discussions in the local governance course 
organized by Wageningen International and the Royal Tropical Institute in the 
Netherlands every year from 2004–08.
² How to improve accountability – ideas from the provincial workshop:
 Involve all stakeholders in multi-stakeholder platforms
 Use environmental radio
 Make public all information on forest laws, rules and regulations, and licences 
 Strengthen the rule of law
 Publish accounts of forest tax income and expenditure
 Publish accounts of taxes paid by companies
 Publish the operational budgets and expected outputs of public agencies
 Respect the constitutional provisions on collecting and allocating forest taxes
Citizens
CDV
CCGF
Provincial network
Provincial forest department
Territorial forest department
Police
Courts
[Not found in this 
case study]
Provincial deputies
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social accountability relations, as well as internal accountability rela-
tions within each stakeholder group, must be mutually reinforcing if 
forest governance is to improve.
The vertical accountability relations are those between the 
provincial deputies and their electorate. Citizens elected their 
provincial deputies in 2006, but the provincial parliaments became 
fully operational only in August 2008. The CSOs are inclined to 
mistrust provincial deputies because they tend to represent the 
interests of the clans who elected them rather than the public inter-
est. Provincial deputies state that their role in forest governance 
is limited. They are uninvolved in the allocation of forest conces-
sions and management planning. Management plans, including the 
social contracts for infrastructure, are discussed by citizens and the 
timber companies. The public sector and provincial deputies only 
intervene when conflicts arise between citizens and the companies. 
They also have played a minor role in negotiations with a Chinese 
firm which aims to produce biofuel from a 100,000 ha forest plot. 
Strategic decisions on the granting of concessions titles are made 
in Kinshasa.
Provincial deputies also stated that their influence on provin-
cial government is limited in terms of questioning and controlling 
performance.¹ Instead of asking provincial authorities to enforce the 
laws and supervise the negotiation and implementation of social 
contracts, they prefer to organise their own demonstrations against 
timber companies. The role of provincial parliaments is expected to 
be strengthened after August 2008.
This vertical accountability relation, as a means for local people 
to improve forest governance by demanding greater transparency, 
accountability and responsiveness from provincial law makers, is 
rather weak. It is expected that vertical accountability relations will 
strengthen as sector governments are established. There are no 
vertical accountability relations between the territory and its citizens, 
because the territory lacks an elected council and its administrator 
is nominated by central government.
The author did not find any indications of horizontal account-
ability relations between the public entities that deliver services to 
citizens and timber companies and those that control them, such 
as public auditing agencies, public observers or ombudsman. For 
forest governance this means that no public entities are monitoring 
the quality of service provision by the provincial and territorial forest 
departments, the police or the territorial administration. To what 
extent are decisions on taxes, sanctions and expenditure related to 
forest resources communicated to citizens and timber companies? 
And to what extent are those decisions implemented correctly by 
public officials? The concept of public entities providing services to 
citizens and entrepreneurs is poorly developed in DRC. Occasion-
ally licences and permits are issued, but usually without sufficient 
protection or rights to the applicant. Timber companies complain 
that, despite complying with all laws and regulations, they continue 
to face demands for different kinds of taxes, licences and permits. 
Having official papers does not necessarily mean that their conces-
sion rights will be protected by the public sector. An operational 
auditing agency or an ombudsman could eventually play a role in 
strengthening forest governance and in particular improve the public 
sector’s performance.
The social accountability relations in Equator province are limited 
to those being established by SVBC. In this type of relation, CSOs 
approach government agencies to request greater answerability 
and more transparency in decision making. The CDVs, for instance, 
are asking the territorial and provincial administrations to be more 
responsive to their complaints about harmful and illegal forest prac-
tices. They are also asking for public monitoring of timber compa-
nies and their implementation of forest management plans. For the 
CCGF, the main issues are greater transparency in tax collection 
and expenditure, as well as effective and correct enforcement of ex-
isting rules and regulations. The requests of the provincial platform 
have yet to be clarified.
A particular feature of the platforms is that they help the timber 
companies to ask for more transparency in decision making and 
a more responsive public sector. They also help in establishing a 
social accountability relation between the public and the private 
sectors. Timber companies cannot elect representatives to parlia-
ment (vertical accountability relation), and horizontal accountability 
relations link only public sector agencies. The literature consulted 
does not discuss accountability relations between the private and 
public sectors. On some issues the companies are aligned with 
the CSOs, such as increased transparency in tax collection and 
expenditure and effective law enforcement. But their interests differ 
when it comes to CSOs monitoring forest management and social 
contracts. As such, different alliances are likely to be created be-
tween the private and public sectors and civil society depending on 
the issue at stake.
Although social accountability relations seem a promising 
strategy for strengthened forest governance, they do not provide a 
source of formal power or “superior authority” to the private sector 
or CSOs for improving public “answerability” and responsiveness. 
The current sources of power are the debating skills, technical 
expertise and charisma of certain platform members.
Internal accountability relations are weak within CSOs and within 
the public sector. Chapter 2 detailed the issue of the representative-
ness of CSO members. Chapter 3 illustrated how public officials 
can ignore existing rules and regulations with impunity.
In summary, vertical and horizontal accountability relations are 
almost absent in Equator province, and internal accountability 
Figure 2 Accountability relations in Equator province
¹ Source: Interview with two provincial deputies.
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relations within CSOs and the public sector are weak. The SVBC 
project has played an important role in establishing social account-
ability relations. Also important is that, whereas the literature does 
not discuss accountability relations between the private and public 
sectors, timber companies are involved in the multi-stakeholder 
platforms, and so – like CSOs – have entry points to request im-
provements in performance from the public sector. The next section 
further analyses these relations. 
Designing social accountability relations – the way 
forward
With regard to social accountability, the platforms in Bikoro have 
identified three entry points for social accountability relations:
 Supporting the initiative of CDVs to denounce harmful and illegal 
forest practices, as well as asking public authorities to respond 
promptly to reported cases. The main issues to address in the 
CCGF and provincial network are safeguarding the interests 
and rights of those who lodge complaints, agreeing on what 
constitutes harmful or illegal practice, and defining the responses 
needed from the public sector.
 Increasing transparency in tax collection and expenditure 
also calls for the development of an accountability relation. At 
present the CCGF may be the best level to work at because 
the territorial administration is entitled to collect taxes on the 
transport of forest products. So the CCGF could work towards 
an overview of those revenues, the corresponding expenditures 
and any anomalies. The timber companies have also suggested 
monitoring their tax, royalty and licence payments, and using 
these figures to verify the accounts provided by local authori-
ties. The release of rents to construct a radio station suggests 
a willingness on the part of territorial authorities to use revenues 
more transparently (though this was a personal initiative by the 
territorial administrator rather than a reflection of institutional 
willingness¹).
 The CCGF could also work towards a relation calling the public 
sector to account for verifying industry compliance with social 
contracts and concession management plans. The public sec-
tor is not involved in negotiating social contracts, however, and 
lacks the resources to monitor forest management plans. So 
CDVs have proposed acting as independent observers.
Creating these relations would give a more meaningful context to 
the ongoing dialogue for improved governance and accountability, 
and strengthening vertical linkages between the platforms created 
by SVBC would help them progress beyond the successful inter-
vention strategies of conflict management and IEC. These relations 
have yet to be agreed by the members of the CCGF and provincial 
network. The most appropriate next step would be to reflect on the 
entry points and agree on the necessary actions.
Designing social accountability relations in Equator province
This section explores the three entry points for accountability rela-
tions in terms of the criteria identified earlier:
 Incentive structure for good behaviour – possibilities to sanction 
or to reward
 Accountability for what – following rules or performance
 Level of institutionalisation
 Depth of involvement
 Inclusiveness of participation
 Branches of government 
 Transparency 
 Answerability and responsiveness
The field visit also provided the opportunity to identify other impor-
tant criteria in the design of social accountability relations. Both will 
be elaborated in this section.
A first effort to translate the above elements of accountability into 
a concept of social accountability for SVBC produces the following:
Incentive structure for good behaviour and sanctioning power. 
What sources of power or “superior authority” do the members of 
the CCGF and provincial network have to impose sanctions if the 
public sector does not respond to the harmful and illegal practices 
exposed by the CDVs? Or if the public sector does not improve the 
transparency of tax collection and expenditure, or does not monitor 
the implementation of forest concession management plans? The 
SVBC project illustrates that sanctioning – and rewarding – powers 
are still limited and that IUCN’s moral support is needed. Neither 
CSOs nor the timber companies have any legalised or formal right 
to sanction the public sector in a social accountability relation. They 
have to rely on other sources of power such as expert power, social 
status and personal traits such as leadership to demand better 
public sector performance. Superior authority in a social account-
ability relation is not formally obtained, but needs to be constructed. 
Civil society will have more power in a situation where citizens elect 
their local councils and provincial deputies, and where those elected 
representatives fulfil their responsibilities, than in one without vertical 
accountability relations.
Accountability for what – following rules or performance? At 
present it is unclear whether accountability relations should be 
based on rules or on performance. When reporting illegal or harm-
ful practices, the CDVs would prefer to have a responsive, i.e. 
performance-oriented, public sector. But in the cases of enforcing 
laws and increasing transparency, their emphasis would be on of-
ficials respecting and enforcing existing rules.
Level of institutionalisation. The question here is to what extent 
the public sector will respect decisions made by the CCGF and pro-
vincial network. The CCGF’s charter does not specify its relations 
with the territorial administration. The relation between the provincial 
network and the provincial administration is similarly undefined. Also 
relevant is the question of the public sector’s involvement in and 
commitment to the CCGF and provincial network. Is this commit-
ment personal or institutional?
Depth of involvement in decision-making. SVBC has opted for 
dialogue and co-management including joint responsibilities in the 
CCGF and the provincial networks. If external accountability is be-
tween separate entities, to what extent can one talk about an exter-
nal relation between civil society, timber companies and the public 
sector if they are organized in platforms that stress co-management 
with joint responsibilities? Might this approach not compromise civil 
society in the long run? This question is relevant to the positioning 
of CDVs as independent forest observers, as co-managers in forest 
governance, or as lobbying and advocacy organisations. SVBC 
clearly positioned CDVs in the co-management role within the 
CCGF, but they have proposed positioning themselves as inde-
pendent observers of timber company performance.
¹ The territorial administrator of Bikoro was replaced in August 2008, but the 
new administrator has shown a willingness to convene the CDVs and other 
stakeholders to discuss forest-related issues in Bikoro.
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Inclusiveness of participation of marginalized groups. The as-
sessment of the internal performance of the platforms revealed 
that CSOs are weak, that those representing marginalised groups 
find it difficult to participate on equal terms with other stakehold-
ers, that CSOs also have difficulty in collaborating, and that CDVs 
do not necessarily represent the entire community. The inventory of 
accountability entry points also shows that the CDVs have made 
some interesting proposals, whereas CSOs at the territorial and 
provincial levels have contributed little (see Chapter 2).
Branches of government. The CDV, CCGF and provincial 
network focus on the executive branch of government. No relations 
have been established with the legislative (provincial parliament) or 
judicial branches (provincial court of justice).
Transparency. One of the most important achievements of 
SVBC is its contribution to disseminating information on laws and 
regulations concerning forest governance. This and the environ-
mental radio station will positively contribute to transparency. At 
the same time, the platforms still need IUCN’s support to obtain 
objective information about forest rules and regulations. And, de-
spite these interventions, many stakeholders interpret even written 
information differently. Disseminating information in DRC is a major 
challenge, and one that is harming transparency and accountability. 
The exclusion of marginalised groups or particular clans from certain 
CDVs is one example of this effect.
Answerability and responsiveness. How can a responsive public 
sector be created in which decision makers have to explain and 
justify their decisions, as well as respond to the demands of right 
holders? When timber companies report artisanal logging in their 
concessions, they can expect an automatic response. But what if 
CDVs were to report that the territorial chief of police was involved 
in the charcoal trade? This question touches on the previously men-
tioned ”superior authority” of civil society and timber companies.
Other factors to consider
Besides the factors identified in the literature, the field visit also 
provided the opportunity to identify other important considerations 
in designing social accountability relations.
 The denunciation of harmful and illegal practices reveals the 
following: 
 Denouncing harmful and illegal forest practices is easier said 
than done. Human rights are regularly violated in DRC (Hu-
man Rights Watch 2009)¹, and political spaces are increas-
ingly being restricted (Human Rights Watch 2008). The UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (United Nations 2007) 
identifies the “prevailing culture of impunity” as the main 
threat to security in the Great Lakes Region as a whole, but 
particularly in DRC. The CDVs fear that their leaders will 
be jailed for denouncing illegal practices by powerful elites. 
Respect for human rights is a precondition for establishing 
effective social accountability relations.
 Knowing what actions are legal or illegal. CDVs can de-
nounce charcoal production and trade, but there are no clear 
rules regulating this economic activity. How can legality or ille-
gality be determined in the absence of formal legal definitions 
and guidance? Answering this question could be the first 
step taken jointly by the SVBC platforms.
 Accountability relations cannot be designed at only one 
platform or administrative level, because higher levels may 
interfere with or counteract the response of lower authorities. 
How can stakeholders ensure that a responsive territo-
rial administration is not overruled by the provincial forestry 
department or court of justice?²
 The lack of transparency in tax collection and expenditure 
highlights the importance of strategically choosing the appropri-
ate administrative level when designing social accountability 
relations. Arguably such relations are more appropriate where 
local governments with elected councils are in place, rather than 
administrative entities performing functions for higher levels of 
government. Under the ongoing process of decentralisation in 
DRC, it is expected that local governments will be created at the 
level of the sector, not the territory. The sector is likely to play an 
important near-term role in collecting and transferring royalties. 
The future role of the territory in collecting taxes is uncertain. 
So it seems more appropriate to establish social accountability 
mechanisms and pursue fiscal transparency at the sector level, 
or at the provincial level where decisions on allocation will also 
be made.
 The enforcement of laws on managing concessions and negoti-
ating a fair division of benefits through the social contract under-
lines the challenges to designing social accountability relations 
that also involve private sector organisations.
 The position of the private sector in accountability relations 
between state and non-state stakeholders is not discussed 
in the literature consulted. It would be interesting to know to 
what extent the private sector will bend the decisions made 
in these platforms to its own interests (working towards 
increased transparency in tax collection and expenditure, but 
not necessarily towards enforcement of social contracts or 
concession management plans).
 The public sector does not help to negotiate social contracts, 
even though it is formally a party to the concession contract 
signed between central government and the timber company, 
and despite the fact that it (and future local governments in 
particular) is responsible for health centres and schools. In 
this situation, how are local authorities to be held accounta-
ble for the future performance of schools and health centres?
 The CDVs have suggested that they monitor implementa-
tion of the forest concession management plan, because 
the public sector is currently incapable of supervising timber 
companies. The timber companies have rejected the idea of 
CDVs playing a role as independent observers of the social 
contract and management plan. The public sector may sup-
port this role, but it will need further discussion in the CCGF 
and the provincial network.
These examples show that the presence of the private sector 
in forest governance complicates the design of accountability rela-
tions. Major issues to take into account include:
¹ Violence and human rights abuses continue in DRC particularly in the east of 
the country. During 2008 hundreds of civilians were killed, thousands of women 
and girls raped, and a further 400,000 people displaced by conflict, pushing 
the total number of displaced persons in North and South Kivu provinces to 
over 1.2 million.
² Two examples illustrate this. The first is the experience of the WRI anti-
corruption committees described earlier. The second is when the territorial 
administrator detained people trapping parrots without a licence. Rather than 
supporting this action, the province prosecuted the administrator because 
some of the parrots died.
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 Who should be held accountable for what? 
Should the private sector be held account-
able for the negotiation and implementation 
of social contracts, or is the social contract 
an issue of public interest and, therefore, of 
public accountability?
 Should CDVs position themselves as inde-
pendent monitors in the forest governance 
regime? Should they stay on the sidelines, 
urging the public and private sector to fulfil 
their responsibilities? Or should they take 
over public tasks such as negotiating social 
contracts on behalf of local communities? 
Conclusions
This chapter aimed to answer the question 
of what type of accountability arrangements 
are needed for improved forest governance. 
It assessed the three types of accountability 
relations identified by Ackerman (2005), show-
ing that vertical and horizontal relations are 
almost absent in Equator province. Internal 
accountability relations within the public sector 
and within civil society in the province are also 
weak. The role and position of the private sec-
tor in accountability relations are largely ignored 
in the literature consulted, but in Equator 
province timber companies are participating in 
the CCGF and provincial network, giving them 
the opportunity to establish social accountabil-
ity relations.
Three potential entry points are identified 
for developing social accountability relations in 
Equator province:
 Supporting the initiative of CDVs to de-
nounce harmful and illegal practices, as well 
as creating a more responsive public sector.
 Making tax collection and expenditure more transparent.
 Enforcing laws, in particular those related to the social contract 
and forest management, and monitoring the implementation of 
concession management plans.
A number of factors in the design of social accountability rela-
tions can be identified from the literature. A preliminary assessment 
of the quality of these relations in Equator province concludes that 
they all focus on the executive branch of government. The possibil-
ity of CSOs sanctioning or rewarding public sector performance is 
limited without strong vertical accountability relations. Other factors 
influencing the quality of social accountability relations include the 
transparency and responsiveness of the pubic sector, and the de-
gree to which marginalised groups are included in decision making 
and oversight.
These factors raise questions about the positioning of the pro-
vincial and territorial platforms in Equator province in relation to the 
public sector (i.e. whether or not the public sector will accept deci-
sions or proposals made by the CCGF or the provincial network). 
The SVBC project opted for co-management and multi-stakeholder 
dialogue, whereas the CDVs are proposing themselves as inde-
pendent observers in the forest governance regime.
The three entry points for social accountability in Bikoro also al-
low other important considerations to be identified. These are:
 Respect for human rights
 Knowing what actions are legal or illegal. This requires a clear, 
relevant legal framework.
 Accountability relations cannot be designed at only one adminis-
trative level. Vertical linkages are necessary in order to harmonise 
interventions by CSOs and the public sector at different levels. 
 Designing social accountability relations at levels where political 
decentralisation has established elected representatives with a 
mandate and a budget.
 The position of the private sector in accountability relations. 
How can stakeholders ensure that companies are being held 
accountable for complying with existing regulations when the 
public sector is not performing? How can they hold the public 
sector accountable? And how strong is their decision-making 
power in multi-stakeholder platforms with weak CSO and public 
sector representatives?
The social accountability relations identified in this chapter 
should provide the necessary context both for strengthening 
SVBC’s intervention strategy and for strengthening vertical linkages 
between the CDV, the CCGF and the provincial platform.
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5  Reflections on governance, 
accountability and action 
research methodologies
This chapter draws out some lessons on analysing forest govern-
ance and accountability, and on the action research methodologies 
used in the study. It also aims to identify key issues to consider in 
the further analysis of governance and accountability relations within 
the NRM sector (as well as other sectors).
Forest governance
The governance definition used in this study emphasises “the whole 
of public and private interactions that are initiated to solve societal 
problems and create societal opportunities” (Bavinck et al. 2005). 
Important elements are:
 The multi-stakeholder character of governance, including the 
interests, perceptions and ambitions of different stakeholders.
 Its operation at different policy and administrative levels.
 Its emphasis on adaptive learning to deal with uncertainty and 
complexity.
 The three “orders” of governance, i.e. those interventions that 
aim to improve the effectiveness of any solutions, those that aim 
to ensure the legitimacy of the institutions, rules and regula-
tions guiding stakeholder interactions, and the norms and 
values underpinning governance principles and giving them their 
legitimacy. 
Initiatives to improve forest governance through a multi-stake-
holder process should take into account the following lessons:
Governance can be socially constructed. Stakeholders may have 
their own perceptions and ideas about how to make forest govern-
ance more effective and more legitimate, and what distinguishes 
“good” from “bad” forest governance. Because governance can be 
constructed, it will be defined differently in different contexts and cir-
cumstances. The case of Equator province shows that stakeholders 
at local, territorial and provincial levels identify different governance 
issues, although they all agree on certain core issues.
Improving governance requires a systems perspective in which it 
is possible to deal with uncertainty and complexity. When con-
structing an improved forest governance regime through a multi-
stakeholder process, it is important to define the boundaries of 
this system. Important criteria for this delimitation could include the 
influence and power of stakeholders to bring about positive change 
in forest governance practice. The Equator province case shows, 
for example, that human rights and the transfer of tax revenues from 
national to provincial and local levels are external factors that SVBC 
projects stakeholders cannot influence.
Viewed from this systems perspective, the key governance ele-
ments to take into account are:
 What are or should be the guiding principles of forest govern-
ance regimes? All stakeholders in Equator province prefer to use 
the forest law, its enforcement, social justice and citizenship as 
a guiding set of principles, with the public sector playing a more 
central role in forest governance. In practice, the private sector 
seems to have taken the lead without any countervailing posi-
tions being taken by the public sector or CSOs. Locally society 
is organised according to clans, patron-client relations and a 
lack of respect for human and political rights. In conclusion there 
is a considerable gap between the actual and preferred forest 
governance regime.
 What and where are the critical entry points in the system 
to bring about change in governance practice? IUCN opted 
for interventions at three different administrative levels and 
organised civil society and the private sector at these lev-
els. Because the public sector in DRC is not in a position to 
contribute to forest governance, one could have also opted for 
organising stakeholders at the level of each concession. Or is 
the critical entry point the location where important decisions 
are made and where policies can be influenced, such as local 
governments with elected councils, or national government? 
Alternatively, why not strengthen the capacity of CSOs to act 
as independent forest monitors? These critical entry points 
should be jointly identified by stakeholders to design appropri-
ate interventions.
 The internal performance of each stakeholder organisation. The 
degree to which an organisation, be it public or private, is able 
to represent its needs and interests will influence its position 
and legitimacy as a stakeholder in efforts to change govern-
ance practice. The weak organisational performance of both 
public and civil society organisations has given a free hand to the 
private sector in Equator province.
 Adaptive learning is key in the process of improving forest 
governance. Stakeholders constantly identify where they are 
in terms of establishing an effective forest governance regime 
with legitimate institutions responding to their norms and values. 
Iterative workshops are necessary to review process and define 
strategies to cope with uncertainties. 
So improving forest governance is a complex process that deals 
with norms, values and perceptions of “good” governance, the 
rules, regulations and structures needed to legitimise actions, and 
the execution of those actions. The field visit to Equator province 
was a first step in identifying the important forest governance issues 
to address. Improving governance will require follow-up actions that 
enable stakeholders to plan jointly their interventions for improving 
forest governance, to learn from their experiences, and to adjust 
their strategies. This process approach may require an external 
facilitator capable of supporting the dialogue between the differ-
ent intervention levels, as well as strengthening the performance of 
each level.
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Accountability
For the purposes of this study, accountability has been defined as 
“a relationship between a bearer of a right or a legitimate claim and 
the agents or agencies responsible for fulfilling or respecting that 
right” (Lawson & Rakner 2005). It includes three important elements: 
accountability relations are between organisations rather than within 
them, social interaction in terms of answerability and enforceability, 
and “superior authority” in that those calling for an account must 
have the rights to demand answers and impose sanctions (Mulgan 
2000, cited by Ackerman 2005). Ackerman distinguishes vertical, 
horizontal and social accountability relations.
“Superior authority” and social accountability relations
The DRC case raises questions about the applicability of “superior 
authority” in a situation where citizens and CSOs are holding the 
public sector accountable through social accountability relations. 
What are the rights, legitimate claims or power that citizens and 
CSOs can draw on to make the public sector accountable and 
to impose sanctions? A citizen has legitimate power in a vertical 
accountability relation through elections. But the relations between 
CSOs as right holders and public sector organisations as duty bear-
ers does not exist formally. CSOs have to rely on soft sources of 
power such as:
 Strong internal organisational performance. CSOs should dem-
onstrate an ability to meet good governance principles such as 
democracy, representativeness, transparency, inclusiveness and 
internal accountability in their own organisations.
 CSOs should operate at different intervention levels, varying from 
local to national or even supra-national level.
 Civil society organisations should be able to work in coalitions 
rather than operating as isolated organisations in relation to the 
State. Their actions should be mutually reinforcing. This is about 
the ability to create alliances.
 Other important sources of power are capacity for negotiation 
and dialogue, knowledgeability, social status and personal traits 
such as leadership capacity.
In future action research, it would be worthwhile exploring the 
power relations between those who are calling for an account and 
those who are supposed to be answerable to them. What sources 
of power are needed to make social accountability relations suc-
cessful ?
The position of private sector organisations and CSOs in 
accountability relations
The case of Equator province also raises questions about who 
should account for what in a situation where the private sector is 
freely exploiting natural resources. Accountability relations are being 
established between the public sector, elected representatives, 
citizens and CSOs. But the position of private sector organisa-
tions in accountability relations with the state or the public sector is 
not addressed in the literature consulted. Yet the DRC case study 
shows the readiness and need of timber companies to ask the pub-
lic sector to be accountable. On the other hand, both civil society 
organisations and the public sector would like the timber companies 
to account for its activities and, eventually, to justify their presence in 
Bikoro territory after the 2008 review of all forest concession titles. 
Some CSOs have even suggested organising themselves as forest 
monitors and reporting illegal practices by timber companies to 
government. So what is the position of private sector organisations 
in the different accountability relations? On some occasions they 
may align themselves with CSOs; on other occasions, the public 
sector and CSOs align themselves to control the private sector; and 
on others CSOs organise themselves to denounce illegal practices 
by both the private and the public sectors. 
Social accountability relations require interventions at different 
levels or entry points
The literature on social accountability relations discusses practical 
tools such as participatory budgeting, citizen juries, social audits, 
citizen report cards and community score cards. In most cases, 
civil society is asked to give its opinion on the performance of one 
public sector agency at one administrative level. These tools do 
not address the multiple relations between different public sector 
agencies at different administrative levels, nor the relations between 
CSOs operating at different administrative levels. The SVBC project 
highlights the importance of linking initiatives vertically to improve 
the accountability of the public sector. If the CDVs want to have a 
public sector that reacts to the exposure of illegal charcoal produc-
tion and trade, not only the territorial administrator but also the court 
of justice in Mbandaka has to be responsive. The CDVs also need 
backup and support from the CSOs at territorial and provincial level 
to prosecute illegal charcoal producers and traders.
The impact of strong social accountability relations on development 
outcomes and forest governance
The literature consulted is optimistic about the impact of social 
accountability relations on development (see Chapter 4). Amongst 
other things, social accountability is seen as a promising alterna-
tive to more conventional training or organisational strengthening 
approaches, and is believed to contribute to capacity development 
(Theisohn 2007). It may also provide some solutions to the double 
crisis of state and market failure in the developing world (Acker-
man 2005). The SVBC project illustrates some of the advantages of 
creating multi-stakeholder platforms to discuss forest governance 
issues. The strengths of these platforms in terms of knowledge, 
skills and attitudes are that all stakeholders obtain the same level of 
information about forest rules and regulations, procedures, and so 
on. The DRC case shows that more transparency decreases the 
number of conflicts based on a lack of information or differing inter-
pretations. With the external support of IUCN, these platforms also 
show some potential for mobilising revenues for the environmental 
radio station. But much remains to be done to improve the perform-
ance of organisations involved in this project.
To some extent, market failure can be corrected through proac-
tive consumers and state failure through the action of an informed 
citizenry which knows its rights and requires government to uphold 
them. In Equator province of DRC, as in other developing and 
developed countries, private sector organisations and the public 
sector are collaborating closely for mutual benefit (either in line 
with rules and regulations or outside them). In practice, civil society 
needs to be well organised, strong and knowledgeable, and have 
the financial means to address injustice, illegal practices, corrup-
tion and bribery. Further research is needed to identify cases where 
CSOs and citizens were able to correct both market and state 
failures in the exploitation of natural resources. This research would 
focus on the alliances between the public and private sector, and 
the strategies used by CSOs to improve transparency and become 
a respected partner in NRM governance.
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Action learning and research
This action-learning/research study aimed to initiate a joint learning 
process aimed at improved forest governance and effective ac-
countability mechanisms in Equator province.
An ideal process of action learning
Ideally the process would allow enough time for stakeholders to:
 Define good forest governance in their own context, including 
the accountability relations necessary to improve governance. 
Here context refers to the different “locations” or intervention 
levels where forest governance decisions are made or forest 
resources exploited or traded. Good forest governance would be 
defined at each level, as it was done at the local, territorial and 
provincial levels in Equator province.
 Define a strategic agenda for improving forest governance at 
each location.
 Share these ideas among all locations or intervention levels, and 
agree on a joint action agenda, including the accountability rela-
tions that need to be established.
 Implement the agenda at each level and ensure vertical linkages 
(bottom-up and top-down communication and alignment).
 Bring all levels together to review progress in improving forest 
governance and (re)define the action agenda as necessary.
 Continue this circle of action learning.
In the time available in Equator province, the joint learning 
addressed some elements of the first and second steps in terms 
of exchanging information, views and perceptions about forest 
governance. The analysis of good forest governance and entry 
points for accountability relations was done by the researcher-
facilitator. There was no time to begin a joint learning process for 
improving forest governance, so follow up from IUCN is required. 
The role of the researcher-facilitator
Given these time constraints, WI concentrated its efforts on collect-
ing data rather than jointly assessing these data with stakeholders. 
Data analysis was done in the Netherlands, without feedback from 
the stakeholders. In this respect the role of WI changed from that of 
a designer and facilitator of an action-research process, to that of 
an external researcher.
In future the links between the interventions by the researcher-
facilitator of an action learning process and their follow-up by the 
donor or sponsor should be taken into account during planning.
Vertical linkages and multi-stakeholder settings contribute towards 
new perspectives and actions for improving forest governance
The bottom-up approach used helped to create the vertical linkages 
necessary in the SVBC project. The study was the first opportunity 
for CDVs to participate in discussions with stakeholders at the 
provincial level. Follow-up meetings are needed for jointly analysing 
forest governance issues. These vertical linkages enable stakehold-
ers to see their problems and challenges from different perspectives 
The same applies to the multi-stakeholder workshops. Both the 
CCGF and the provincial workshops were used to interpret rules 
and regulations jointly, to discuss stakeholders’ behaviour, and to 
increase mutual understanding.
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governance in Bikoro territory of Equator province, DRC:
 What is good forest governance according to the stakeholders 
involved at different levels in SVBC?
 What type of accountability arrangements are needed for im-
proved forest governance?
 What potential do the structures established by SVBC have to 
improve forest governance and, in particular, accountability?
 What are the implications for analysing forest governance and 
accountability in other contexts, including interventions and the 
action research needed to strengthen them?
This chapter summarizes the answers from the research and 
makes some recommendations for IUCN. It also draws out some 
lessons for future analysis of accountability relations.
Answering the research questions
What is good forest governance according to the stakeholders involved 
at different levels in SVBC?
Table 4 lists the forest governance issues identified as important by 
project stakeholders.
Table 4 Stakeholder concerns in forest governance, Equator province
Platform Issue
Local   Being able to denounce harmful practices to responsive public 
authorities
  Equity in sharing forest revenues and resources among the 
local population
  Conflicts managed locally without intervention by the provincial 
court
Territorial The above issues, plus
  A coherent regulatory framework that guides stakeholder 
interventions in the forest sector
  Adequate law enforcement
  Transparency in tax collection and expenditure
Provincial   Equity in sharing forest revenues and resources by the local 
population
  Transparency in tax collection and expenditure
All levels   Civil society participation in decision making
  Acceptance of the forest law as a binding set of rules
  Decentralisation of tax collection and expenditure
  Information, education and communication (IEC)
Some of these issues can be addressed by the CDVs, the 
CCGF and the provincial network, but others are beyond their 
control and can be considered external factors. These include the 
decentralisation process, the incomplete regulatory framework, the 
exclusion of public health and education agencies from negotiations 
on the social contract, the energy crisis in Kinshasa, and a failing 
justice sector that undermines respect for human rights.
It is also clear from the study that the performance of the public 
sector and civil society in forest governance has been weak. The 
resulting lack of oversight has given timber companies, charcoal 
producers and artisanal loggers a free hand to exploit forests as 
they wish.
What type of accountability arrangements are needed for improved 
forest governance?
The assessment of existing accountability arrangements shows that 
vertical (between citizens and elected representatives) and hori-
zontal (internal public sector arrangements) accountability relations 
are almost absent. Potential exists to design new accountability 
relations between CSOs, the public sector and timber companies 
based on three entry points:
 Supporting the initiative of CDVs to denounce harmful and il-
legal forest practices, as well as asking authorities to respond 
more promptly to complaints. The main issues to address in the 
CCGF and provincial network are safeguarding the rights and 
interests of those who make complaints, agreeing with stake-
holders on what constitutes legal or illegal practice, and defining 
the responses needed from the public sector.
 Making tax collection and expenditure more transparent also 
calls for the development of an accountability relation. At present 
the CCGF is best placed to work on this because the territo-
rial administration has the power to collect certain taxes, and 
the CCGF could work with it to obtain an overview of these 
revenues and identify any anomalies. A first step was made in 
this direction when the CCGF succeeded in obtaining some rent 
revenues to construct an environmental radio station. Timber 
companies have also suggested that they monitor their tax pay-
ments and use this information to verify the revenues reported by 
local authorities.
 The CCGF could also work towards an accountability relation 
in which the public sector is held accountable for companies 
complying with their social contracts and concession manage-
ment plans. At present the public sector is uninvolved in social 
contract negotiations and lacks the resources to monitor man-
agement plans. The CDVs have proposed acting as independent 
observers of these issues.
What potential do the structures established by IUCN have to improve 
forest governance and, in particular, accountability? 
Answering this question means taking three elements into considera-
tion: the internal performance of each structure; the intervention strat-
egies in place and their future role; and the design of each structure.
The platforms only recently became operational and still face 
internal performance bottlenecks preventing them from contribut-
ing fully to governance and accountability. These include a lack of 
6  Promoting forest governance 
and accountability – conclusions 
and recommendations
This exploratory study sought answers to four questions about forest 
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representativeness; the limited capacity of some member CSOs 
to participate effectively in the CCGF; limited public sector capac-
ity; and the dependence of all stakeholders on IUCN for objective 
information, moral support for the CDVs, day-to-day management 
of the platforms and meeting allowances.
SVBC has contributed towards the elements of good forest 
governance in several ways:
 Conflict management at the local level. Stakeholders see this as 
the most important significant change resulting from the project.
 IEC activities on forest laws and implementing decrees, and 
stakeholder rights and obligations. These activities continue to 
be needed because of communication failures and cultural ob-
stacles. SVBC has contributed a great deal to forest governance 
in terms of providing information, but much remains to be done 
which cannot be the responsibility of IUCN alone.
 Transparency in tax collection and expenditure. With consider-
able support from IUCN, some rents collected by Bikoro territory 
have been used to build an environmental radio station.
IUCN’s intervention strategy seems a relevant and promising one 
in the context of Bikoro, where existing forest rules and regulations 
do not provide a framework to address forest governance issues 
at either territorial or provincial level. The structures established 
under SVBC will contribute to defining local rules, regulations and 
practices. The project’s conflict management and information dis-
semination strategies have proved successful and should con-
tinue. Creating vertical linkages between the three platforms is an 
important strategy to develop further, as is continuing the dialogue 
within each platform. These two strategies will be important both for 
strengthening forest governance and for designing social account-
ability relations.
What are the implications for analysing forest governance and 
accountability in other contexts, including interventions and the 
action research needed to strengthen them?
Initiatives to improve forest governance through a multi-stakeholder 
process should take into account the following lessons:
Forest governance can be socially constructed and requires a 
systems perspective to deal with uncertainty and complexity. When 
constructing “good” forest governance through a multi-stakeholder 
process it is important to define the boundaries of this system. 
Important criteria for this delimitation could include the influence 
and power of stakeholders to bring about positive change in forest 
governance practices. Key questions to consider are: 
 What do stakeholders believe are, or should be, the principles 
guiding forest governance?
 What and where are the critical entry points in the system to 
bring about change in governance practices? 
 How can the internal performance of each stakeholder organisa-
tion be strengthened? 
 How can stakeholders be engaged in a process of adaptive 
learning?
Improving forest governance is a complex process dealing with 
norms, values and perceptions of good governance, the rules, 
regulations and structures necessary to legitimise actions, and the 
effectiveness of those actions in improving forest governance.
The assessment and design of accountability relations, and 
in particular social accountability relations, require future action 
research on the following issues:
 How can citizens and CSOs influence the performance of the 
public and private sectors? A key issue to explore in these 
relations is the soft sources of power giving CSOs the ”superior 
authority” to demand answers from and impose sanctions on 
those in charge.
 The position of private sector organisations and CSOs requires 
special attention in situations where the private sector is exploit-
ing natural resources and where public sector performance is 
weak. They have the possibility of engaging in a social account-
ability relation that enables them to align with CSOs on some 
issues. On others, the public sector and CSOs will have to align 
themselves to control the private sector.
 Effective social accountability relations require interventions at 
different decentralised levels or entry points, and should also 
include vertical alignment and harmonisation of interventions.
The impact of social accountability relations on development 
outcomes, and in particular on forest and NRM governance, 
requires further research. To what extent do social accountability 
relations contribute to developing capacity, and to what extent are 
CSOs and citizens able to correct market and state failures in the 
exploitation of natural resources?
An ideal process of action learning for improved forest govern-
ance requires more than the two weeks of field work available for 
this study. It should allow enough time for all stakeholders to jointly 
assess, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate forest governance 
and accountability relations. Facilitating the dialogue across vertical 
linkages and multi-stakeholder settings will contribute towards new 
perspectives on improving forest governance. These new perspec-
tives will in turn generate new ideas and intervention strategies for 
better forest governance.
Recommendations for IUCN
Strategic project design issues
Notwithstanding DRC’s 2002 moratorium on the allocation, exten-
sion and renewal of forest concession titles, and its prolongation in 
2005, all timber companies operating in Bikoro obtained their titles 
after 2002. The titles of Leyda and ITB, the two timber companies 
most active in SVBC, were withdrawn after a national review of 
concessions in 2008. The recommendation to IUCN is to consider 
the legal status of timber companies before engaging with them in 
its projects.
Another issue is the choice of administrative level for the different 
project platforms. Although the territory was chosen as the level 
for the CCGF, the sector and the province will hold a mandate for 
forest governance under the ongoing process of decentralisation. 
Amongst other things, the sector will be responsible for local devel-
opment planning and the social infrastructure created or repaired 
under social contracts. The role of the territory is still undefined, 
though it is assumed that it will have only an implementing role as a 
deconcentrated entity and no decision-making powers. 
In light of these observations, it is recommended that IUCN 
reviews the role and position of the private sector in SVBC, as well 
as the appropriate administrative levels for future multi-stakeholder 
dialogue and action.
Promoting forest governance
After identifying forest governance issues in Bikoro with SVBC 
stakeholders, the next step will be to reconvene stakeholders to 
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agree on priority issues. This will allow the platforms to decide on 
their own good-enough forest governance agendas.
 First, the platforms should try to cooperate in tackling the 
charcoal supply chain, artisanal logging and industrial forest 
exploitation. This should increase the effectiveness of their 
interventions in line with the governance elements identified by 
Bavinck et al. (2005).
 Second, stakeholders should discuss how far they accept the 
legitimacy of existing institutions, rules and regulations, for exam-
ple the forest law. In the absence of formal or acceptable rules 
for charcoal production and trade, artisanal logging or industrial 
forest exploitation, local stakeholders should agree informal rules 
and regulations.
 Third, agreement should be sought on normative issues in for-
est governance, for example the desired degree of civil society 
participation in decision making, and the interpretation of equity 
in the sharing of forest resources and benefits. 
Designing social accountability relations
If the platforms decide to pursue one or more of the social account-
ability relations identified in this study, they should consider the 
following issues:
 What possibilities do CSOs have to sanction or reward public 
sector performance?
 To what extent will the public sector accept decisions or propos-
als made by the CCGF or the provincial network?
 To what extent can CSOs ask for accountability in a situation 
where human rights are regularly violated?
 In the absence of a clear and comprehensive legal framework, 
what forest activities should be considered legal or illegal, and 
who should decide?
 Accountability relations cannot be designed at only one adminis-
trative level. Vertical linkages are needed to harmonise interven-
tions by CSOs and the public sector at different levels.
 Design social accountability relations at levels where political 
decentralisation has established elected representatives with a 
mandate and budget.
 The position of the private sector in accountability relations, in 
particular ensuring that they are held accountable for legal com-
pliance when the public sector is not performing.
Implications for intervention strategies
Promoting forest governance and designing social accountability 
relations will require a slight reorientation of the strategies so far 
pursued by the platforms. IUCN’s efforts will be needed to promote 
dialogue and communication between the different stakeholders, as 
well as vertical relations between the platforms. This means more 
intensive facilitation of general assemblies at each level, as well as 
facilitating joint meetings at which the three platforms develop their 
strategic agendas. The strategies of conflict management at the lo-
cal level and information dissemination should also be continued.
At the same time, it should be recognised that the structures put 
in place have yet to mature, and that IUCN will organise training to 
address organisational performance issues.
Recommendations for future action research
An ideal process of action learning and research on forest govern-
ance and accountability arrangements would allow enough time for 
all stakeholders to:
 Define good forest governance in their own context, including 
the accountability relations necessary to improve governance. 
Here the context refers to different “locations” or intervention 
levels where forest governance decisions are made or forest 
resources exploited or traded. At these locations good forest 
governance would be defined, as it was done at the local, ter-
ritorial and provincial levels in Equator province.
 Define a strategic agenda for improving forest governance at 
each location.
 Share these ideas among all locations or intervention levels, and 
agree on a joint action agenda, including the accountability rela-
tions that need to be established.
 Implement the agenda at each level and ensure vertical linkages 
(bottom-up and top-down communication and alignment).
 Bring all levels together to review progress in improving forest 
governance and (re)define the action agenda as necessary.
 Continue this circle of action learning.
This process would involve more than a short field visit, and 
would include workshops at different levels as well as exchanges 
allowing the dialogue to span different intervention levels. However, 
taking into account the limited time usually available for multi-stake-
holder workshops, similar assignments in the future should be re-
stricted either to defining an agenda for improved forest governance 
or to designing accountability relations. It is unlikely that there will be 
enough time to address both.
The following steps are suggested for a multi-stakeholder 
workshop aimed at defining a strategic agenda for improving forest 
governance:
 Identify relevant and important forest governance issues at loca-
tions or intervention levels.
 Assess the current forest governance situation in terms of its 
effectiveness, the legitimacy of its structures, its rules and regula-
tions, and the norms and values important to stakeholders.
 Categorise forest governance issues according to whether they 
are within or outside the control of stakeholders.
 Based on steps 1–3, define the elements of a strategic “good-
enough” forest governance agenda for joint implementation.
A multi-stakeholder workshop on designing suitable accountabil-
ity relations or arrangements could follow three steps:
 Identify entry points for improving accountability, using Figure 1 
to map current and desired accountability relations.
 Assess the feasibility of designing these relations in the prevailing 
forest governance regime using the eight criteria identified in this 
study (see Chapter 4).
 Discuss and agree on actions to reinforce the accountability 
relations.
Both workshop methodologies would be worth testing in future 
field assignments on forest governance.
   
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Annexes
Resource people
Name Affiliation
Joël Kiyulu IUCN, Kinshasa
Sylvie Ngoye Digital Congo TV
Michel Mboyo, Pierre Iyanza and Boholo Monitoring agents of IUCN, Bikoro
Antoine Bobuo-Ixisambenga Supervisor, Forest Section, Bikoro territorial administration
Dominique Nlandu Administrator, Bikoro territory
[Name not recorded] Representative of local anti-corruption committees (comités de lutte anti-tracasserie) of WRI project, Bikoro
Joseph Nzboika Chair, Union of Pygmy Farmers, Bikoro, and member, CCGF
Ir. Lompese Bolingo ITB representative, CCGF
Hon. Nkumu Beleli and Hon. Nkumu Isangola Provincial deputies of the Provincial Parliament, Mbandaka
Hussi Huyong Soyongo Directorate-General for Administrative, Judicial, Property and Share Revenues, Equator province
Arnault Huang Representative of a Chinese enterprise acquiring land for palm oil production
Berger J. P. Bompema Secretary General, REBOGOF
Père Joseph Mahonde Catholic priest in Bikoro Parish and Chair, Executive Committee of CCGF
Mamisha Mboliaha Representative of the women’s department of Bikoro territory
Nkumu Boumard Ex-IUCN facilitator in Bikoro, teacher and “patron scieur”
Timothée Alunga Forest engineer of timber company LEDITAC-Ledya in Kolosorba/Bikoro; member of REBOGOF and official of the 
Ministry of Environment
Victor Vundu Lawyer, Ministry of Environment
Françoise van de Ven Representative of Timber Industries Federation, DRC
Workshop participants
CDV workshop in Bikoro
Name Position Affiliation/CDV Name Position Affiliation/CDV
Wafo Ikula President CDV Bolaka Bolili Bo Malenge President CDV
Bokele Wanyoke President CDV Kalamba Justin Bayeli Nkumu Secretary CDV
Yoka Mpata Secretary CDV Mpaha Vincent Mpolo President CDV Boyeka
Mola Yambe Secretary CDV Iyembe Monene Bakono Lunamela President CDV Esenge Ibenga
Mabonogo Ma Mboyo President CDV Iyembe Monene Daniel Nkake President CDV Itipo
Yando Mola Dev President CDV Mpaha A.T. Dominique Secretary Executive Committee, CCGF
Nkombe Eyamba President CDV Elanga Nkumu Wa Nkumu Secretary CDV Ngengobala
Bosenge Elima President CDV Ekombe Mputu Ipaka President CDV Ngengobala
Nkumu Iyeli President CDV Wala Isene Ekunde Ndelele Secretary CDV Boyeka
Iyeli Mpela Secretary CDV Wala Isene Lombe Belio President CDV Nkombe Mbongo
Bolingi Bipeke President CDV Bokongo Lobotobe Mbila Secretary CDV Nkombe Mbongo
Boongo Bolibongo Secretary CDV Bokongo Lompoku Bioto President CDV Cequa
Jacques Loimi President CDV Ikoko Nkana Bokaka Secretary CDV Lokanga
Loimi Yolo Tshebo Secretary CDV Ikoko Bopete Wepoko President CDV Lokanga
Mozart Bokulu President CDV Bikoro Sebastien Bokenge President CDV Moheli
Amba Ilebo Secretary CDV Bikoro Amba Engale Secretary CDV Moheli
Buelo Nkumu Vice-president CDV Bikoro J. P. Lokuba President CDV Mpenda
Bosco Mputu President CDV Maringo Raphael Mongu President CDV Iyembe Moke
Bontula Bosobe Vice-president CDV Butela Fulgence Bongongo Reporter CCGF
Michel Mboyo Monitoring agent IUCN, Bikoro Mputu Iluku President CDV Bokonda Bibelo
Pierre Iyanza Monitoring agent IUCN, Bokongo Iyeli Nkake President CDV Momboyo
Boholo Monitoring agent IUCN, Momboyo Mpia Vissi Mev President CDV Momboyo
Mongu Bisio Secretary CDV Cequa Iyeliliko Insemba President CDV Nzalekanga
Lompese Bolingo T. President Executive Committee, CCGF Bicka Secretary CDV Butela
Mpholho Bal President CDV Mabonzi Booka Bosonge Secretary CDV Momboyo
Mpia Esuna Secretary CDV Mabonzi Booto Biembe Secretary CDV Mbuli
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CCGF workshop in Bikoro
Name Position Affiliation Name Position Affiliation
Ir. Lompese Bolingo President Executive Committee, CCGF Pélagie Iyopa President CCPE/media
Mabonzo Mo Mboyo President CDV Iyembe Monene Camos Nkumu President Clan 
Michel Mboyo Monitoring agent IUCN, Bikoro Ikol ‘Iluate Head of Sector Public sector
Yando Mola President CDV Mpaha Geny Ekofa Vice-president Executive Committee, CCGF
Bokulu Mozapy President CDV Bikoro Nkumu Boumard Facilitator CCGF
Mola Monsomo President CDV Nzalekenga Jacques Loimi Mboyo President CDV Ikoko Mpenge
Raphael Molngu President CDV Iyembe Moke Mpolho Balamba President CDV Mabonzi
Lompoku Bioto President CDV Cequa Bontuba Bosobe President CDV Butela
Paulette Bolumbu Member, CCGF Civil society Vincent Mpolo President CDV Boyeka
Mboliaha Boongo Member, CCGF Public sector Daniel Nkake President CDV Itipo
Fulgence Bongongo Trainer and coach, CDV CDV Sebastien Bokenge President CDV Moheli
Botuli Bongelo Head of Grouping Maringa Grouping Bosco Mputu President CDV Maringo
Lobey Vasco Member, CCGF Civil society Nkumu Iyeli Mbao President CDV Wala Isene
Amba Bavon Member, CCGF Civil society Wafo Ikula President CDV Bolaka
Nkombe Eyamba President CDV Elanga Elima Bonsenge — CDV Ekombe
Bakomo Lunamela President CDV Esenge Ibenga Bopete W’edoko — CDV Lokanga
Patrice Bolili President CDV Mbuli Bobuo Wisambenga Environmental officer Bikoro administration 
Iyeli Nkake President CDV Momboyo Boketsu Inengola Agricultural officer Bikoro administration
Mputu Ipaka President CDV Ngengobala Bola Bobonda President UDME
Bokele Wanyoke President CDV Kalamba J. B. Yoka Ibongu Traditional chief CCGF 
Pierre Iyanza Monitoring agent IUCN, Bokongo Franc Ntotele Bobuya Head of Grouping Bons Grouping 
Lombe Belio President CDV Nkombe Mbongo Loma Lotula Member, CCGF Public sector
Mputu Iluku President CDV Bokonda Bibelo Joseph Nzee Boika — Civil society (Pygmies)
Belingo Bipeke President CDV Bokongo Pandjovu Yekeko Commandant/Police Bikoro administration
Bolondo Jean Civil Society CAIG Dominique Nlandu Territorial Administrator Bikoro administration
Christian Musubi Public sector CAIG
Provincial workshop in Mbandaka
Name Position Affiliation Name Position Affiliation
Hussi Huyong Soyongo Provincial Director Directorate General for 
Administrative, Judicial, 
Property and Share 
Revenues
Boumard Nkumu Iyeli Trainer and coach CCGF
Me. Ant. Yolo Nkoto President of Notability Notability of Mbandaka City Emmanuel Lopo Permanent Secretary ACREPADE, Equator province
Fulgence Bongongo Trainer and coach, CDV CDV Berger J. P. Bompema Secretary General of 
REBOGOF
Civil society (Church) 
Jacques Loimi Mboyo CDV Bikoro CDV Dominique Lando Pandi Territorial Administrator 
Bikoro
Bikoro administration and 
CCGF
Pelagie Iyopa Présidente Journaliste Media Mamisa Mboliaha Women and Family Affairs 
Section
Bikoro administration and 
CCGF
Joseph Nzee Boika CAIG Civil society (Pygmies) Loma Motuli President CMO
Jean Bolondo President, CAIG CAIG Antoine Bomboko Researcher Provincial Governorate
John Benani Member, REBOGOF REPEQ/REBOGOF Ilongo Loleka Vice-president REBOGOF
Joseph Mahonde President Executive Committee, CCGF Mwangalalo Olivier Member, REBOGOF DGM, Equator
Claire Bosenge Director Caritas Diocesan Office, 
Mbandaka-Bikoro
Faustin Bintsako Member, REBOGOF ANR, Equator
Sr. Victorine Bombula Nun SSC Hon. Nkumu Beleli Provincial Deputy Provincial Parliament
Barnabé Bongambo Expert REBOGOF Hon. Nkumu Isangola Provincial Deputy Provincial Parliament
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Workshop programmes
Programme Methodology Observations
CDVs
What does the forest mean to us? Rich picture To set the context for the workshop
What has been the most significant change 
in forest governance and management 
you have contributed to? How did you 
contribute?
MSC question as the Discovery phase in the 
AI methodology
One new and one existing CDV worked together in a pair
Rather than comparing the MSC stories, they were clustered 
by the workshop moderator (WI)
What are the three most important 
wishes you have in relation to good forest 
governance?
Dream phase in AI Clustering by WI
How would you realise these dreams of 
good forest governance, and who should 
take the lead?
Design/Decision phase in AI
CCGF
Validation of the findings of the CDV 
workshop
Presentation of findings and sub-group work 
(civil society group, public sector group and 
private sector group)
Because half of participants had participated in the CDV 
workshop, the WI facilitator wanted to probe the results of that 
meeting rather than go through another AI process
Discussion with the CDVs on the constraints 
and opportunities for denouncing illegal 
actions
Group work while other groups validate the 
results of the CDV workshop
This session was organized because the field visit to one 
village proved that CDVs face difficulties in denouncing illegal 
practices. This is important in the search for appropriate ac-
countability systems
Analysis of artisanal logging system and 
charcoal production and supply system
Sub-group work on the following questions:
Are you satisfied with the current system? 
Who is benefiting from this system? What 
is needed to improve the governance of this 
system?
This session was organized to obtain more information on how 
people see the governance of both forest sub-sectors.
Formulation of recommendations to 
CDVs and the CCGF for improving forest 
governance
Provincial Network
What does good forest governance mean 
to you?
(In terms of the AI approach, this question 
belongs to the Dream phase)
Work in sub-groups (civil society, public sector, provincial deputies and private sector)
Discussion in plenary leading to identification of three key areas of governance:
 Corruption, poor public sector performance and a lack of respect for the law
 Design of accountability mechanisms
 Amendment of the forest law
How can performance in the three key 
areas of governance be improved?
(In terms of the AI approach, this question 
belongs to the Design phase)
Sub-group work on the above-mentioned 
topics
Formulation of recommendations for the 
provincial network and CCGF
Plenary session

Wageningen University & Research Centre in the Netherlands aims to address global 
challenges of sustainable development through what it calls “science for impact”. 
The Wageningen International Capacity Development and Institutional 
Change Programme (CD&IC) is part of this strategy. We offer partners and clients a 
comprehensive range of capacity development services. These combine our expertise 
on innovation, learning processes and institutional change. Our approach brings different 
stakeholders together in constructive dialogue and integrates scientific understanding 
and technology development with processes of organisational and social change.
We work in partnership with other knowledge centres, government agencies, civil 
society organisations and businesses from around the world. Our focus is the challenges 
facing food systems, agricultural markets and trade, natural resources management and 
the livelihoods of rural people.
CD&IC is hosted by Wageningen International, which provides a focal point for 
accessing the knowledge and expertise of Wageningen University & Research Centre.
This publication has been produced in part with the assistance of the European Union. 
The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the author and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.
IUCN, the International Union for Conservation of Nature, helps the world find 
pragmatic solutions to our most pressing environment and development challenges.
IUCN works on biodiversity, climate change, energy, human livelihoods and greening 
the world economy by supporting scientific research, managing field projects all over the 
world, and bringing governments, NGOs, the United Nations and companies together to 
develop policy, laws and best practice.
IUCN is the world’s oldest and largest global environmental organization, with more 
than 1,000 government and NGO members, and almost 11,000 volunteer experts in 
some 160 countries. IUCN’s work is supported by over 1,000 staff in 60 offices and 
hundreds of partners in public, non-governmental and private sectors around the world.
